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Abstract 
We build an equilibrium model of the market for nursing home care with decision-makers on 
both sides of the market. The nursing home demand arises as a result of stochastic dynamic 
optimizations by households heterogeneous in age, health, wealth; and the cost of home-and-
community-based care. On the supply side, locally competitive nursing homes decide prices 
and care intensity. The government pays for the long-term care of the poorest. We estimate the 
model parameters using Health and Retirement Survey and simulate the model to quantitatively 
evaluate the effects of long-term care policies on prices, intensities, care allocation, and welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the big triumphs of the last century is the greatly increased human life 
expectancy. Growing old, however, still often comes with accumulation of difficulties 
with activities of daily living such as eating, toileting, dressing, bathing, getting in and 
out of bed, etc. According to the recent estimates by U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (2020), about 70%of Americans older than 65 develop a severe need 
for long-term care (LTC) and about half receive paid care over their lifetime. Hurd, 
Michaud, and Rohwedder (2014) find that more than half of individuals will end up using 
nursing home care after age 50. Long-term care is expensive: According to Genworth 
(2019), the annual cost of a nursing home stay in 2019 is over $100K for a private room 
and over $90K for a semi-private room; in-home care costs more than $20 per hour. 
The high out-of-pocket cost of long-term care forces a large share of Americans to rely 
on public long-term services and supports (LTSS) programs, most importantly 
Medicaid.1 In fact, Medicaid pays for about 75% of nursing home residents and for 
about as many individuals in home-and-community-based care (HCBC), which further 
exacerbates the financial burden of public old-age programs, already strained by the 
population ageing. In this paper, we argue that the effects of public LTSS policies go 
beyond the budgetary and consumer insurance implications, and have nontrivial effects 
on the nursing home market. The changes in the market equilibrium, in turn, affect the 
allocation of care and distribution of welfare gains and losses from the LTSS policies. 
                                               
1 Medicaid covers 51% of the total LTSS costs in the U.S. (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2015). 
Half of Medicaid LTSS enrollees are in nursing homes while the other half uses HCBC. 
Medicaid nursing home expenditures account for 70% of total Medicaid LTSS spending 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016). 
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We build a dynamic structural model of a nursing home market with an objective 
to quantitatively evaluate LTSS policies. In our model, demand and supply of nursing 
home care arise as a results of decision-making by optimizing agents. On the demand 
side, households, heterogeneous in age, financial resources, health, and family status, 
make consumption-savings decisions, and those with an LTC need choose to receive 
care either at a nursing home or in their own home. On the supply side, locally 
competitive nursing homes decide price and care intensity, taking as given the demand 
from the households. Medicaid LTSS policy imposes rules on both sides of the market. 
On the demand side, it determines eligible individuals through means tests and allows 
them to receive a certain amount of LTSS for free, either at home or in a nursing home. 
On the supply side, Medicaid reimburses nursing homes at a fixed rate. We show that 
Medicaid policy targeting either side of the market has important consequences for both 
households and nursing homes, with nontrivial equilibrium effects on nursing home 
prices, quality, care allocation, and welfare. 
On the demand side, we solve stochastic dynamic problems of retired 
households. Households face uncertainty about their health, which determines their 
LTC need, own and spouse mortality, child proximity (for those with children), and LTC 
preferences. In contrast to the literature on old-age decisions and risks (Kopecky and 
Koreshkova 2014, Ameriks et al. 2018, among others), we model the choice of care to 
endogenize nursing home entry: For each period, individuals with LTC needs choose 
between nursing home care and HCBC. While nursing homes provide fixed intensity of 
care, households can freely choose HCBC intensity. Although nursing home care is 
inflexible, the institutional setting allows nursing homes to provide care at a potentially 
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lower unit cost compared to HCBC. HCBC’s out-of-pocket costs differ across the 
households: It is relatively low for those with family support from the non-LTC spouse or 
a nearby child, and it is high for those without family support. Moreover, individuals 
without family face a substantial fixed cost when using HCBC to outsource basic home 
production. Poor households eligible for Medicaid decide whether to forfeit their 
resources and use Medicaid LTSS (for either nursing-home care or HCBC) or pay for 
the HCBC out of pocket and use low-intensity care. The individual choice of care gives 
rise to the demand for nursing homes. While the private demand has standard 
properties, the demand by Medicaid enrollees does not depend on the price and 
increases in care intensity. 
We discipline the model’s demand-side parameters with micro-evidence on the 
LTC usage patterns observed in the data. Using the Health and Retirement Study data, 
we document the type and care intensity used conditional on age, financial resources, 
health, and family status. The model equilibrium successfully generates the key 
documented care patterns. In particular, individuals without family are more likely to 
reside in a nursing home and nursing home usage is U-shaped in wealth. 
On the supply side, we solve a static problem of a nursing home competing in the 
local market with other nursing homes. Each nursing home faces an identical cost 
structure: A fixed operational cost and a variable cost of providing care that depends on 
the number of beds and care intensity. A nursing home decides the out-of-pocket bed 
price and care intensity to maximize its profits, taking as given the household demand 
for care, the Medicaid bed-reimbursement rate  (set below the out-of-pocket price), as 
well as competitors’ prices and care intensity. Medicaid regulations prohibit denying 
4 
nursing home entry to its enrollees. As a result, nursing homes have a single control — 
the intensity of care — for the number of Medicaid beds and two controls—the intensity 
and price — for the number of private beds. Although the private bed’s profit margin 
exceeds that of the Medicaid bed, the relative elasticities of private demand versus 
Medicaid demand matter when deciding the optimal quantity and allocation of beds. We 
solve for the Nash equilibrium of the nursing home market, and calibrate the supply-side 
parameters to match the key statistics from the Pennsylvania Department of Health’s 
Nursing Home Reports.2 
We use the calibrated model to quantitatively evaluate the efficiency and 
distributional effects of four LTSS policies. Two of them target the supply side of the 
nursing home market: (i) a more generous Medicaid nursing home-bed reimbursement 
and (ii) a nursing home’s subsidized entry into a market. The other two target the 
demand side: (iii) a more generous Medicaid means test for single households and (iv) 
a HCBC subsidy for individuals with no family support. We show that in every case it is 
important to capture the impact of the policies on both sides of the market. 
A higher Medicaid reimbursement rate increases the return on Medicaid beds. In 
order to attract more Medicaid residents, nursing homes increase the care intensity. We 
find that a 10% increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate raises the intensity of care 
by 3% and the out-of-pocket price by 2%. New Medicaid beds amount to 3.6% of the 
baseline number, and crowd out private beds (1.9% of the baseline number). Nursing 
                                               
2 Online Appendix A in Hackmann (2019) reports that the nursing home market in Pennsylvania 
is fairly representative of the U.S. nursing home market. Following Hackmann (2019), we 
model the nursing home market based on observations from one state, instead of conflating 
nursing home market characteristics across multiple states. The calibration of our model can 
be easily modified to match observations from other states. 
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home profits and Medicaid outlays increase. Households in the middle of the wealth 
distribution see small benefits from the higher nursing home care intensity. Households 
in the top wealth quartile see small losses due to higher out-of-pocket price. 
A nursing home’s subsidized entry into a market increases the local competition. 
We find that incumbents react to the entry not only by reducing the price by 10.7%, but 
also by reducing the intensity of care by 7.3%. These nursing home decisions induce 
movements in and out of institutional care. Wealthier individuals, experiencing welfare 
gains from the lower price and a larger selection of facilities, leave out-of-pocket HCBC 
for nursing homes. Individuals in the bottom half of the wealth distribution, experiencing 
welfare losses due to the lower intensity of nursing home care, free Medicaid beds in 
favor of Medicaid and out-of-pocket HCBC. This reallocation of care increases the 
number of out-of-pocket residents by 13.8% and reduces the number of Medicaid beds 
by 18.4% per nursing home: The total number of Medicaid nursing home residents 
decreases even though there are more nursing homes available. 
We then consider a more generous Medicaid policy on the demand side by 
raising the amount of wealth single individuals are allowed to keep when qualifying for 
Medicaid — from virtually zero to $10,000. We find that nursing homes react to the 
larger pool of single Medicaid enrollees by increasing the care intensity by 6.7%) and 
further stimulating the demand for Medicaid beds, with the total increase of 34.5%. The 
12.9% higher bed price discourages private residents from staying in nursing homes, 
reducing their number by 22.1%. Although consumers across the wealth distribution 
experience welfare gain from this policy (with the largest gains for the middle two 
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quartiles), the increase in the Medicaid outlays exceeds the increase in the consumer 
surplus nearly by a factor of two. Nursing homes experience a small loss. 
In our last policy experiment we introduce a $10,000 subsidy to the HCBC for 
individuals with no family support that allows them to cover half of the fixed HCBC cost. 
As private residents with no family support leave nursing home for cheaper out-of-
pocket HCBC, nursing homes react by reducing both the price (-4.5%) and the intensity 
of care (-7.7%). Lower intensity of care makes nursing home less valuable to Medicaid 
enrollees; as a result, 12.8% leave their free nursing home beds. We find that more than 
half of them switch to out-of-pocket HCBC, reducing the Medicaid outlays by 2.7%. 
Even though nursing homes lose 12% of their residents, their profits are almost 
unaffected due to cost savings. Consumers in the bottom wealth quartiles experience 
welfare gains from more affordable out-of-pocket HCBC; those in the top wealth 
quartiles experience welfare gains from the cheaper nursing home price. 
We find that in all of the above policy experiments the reactions of both sides of 
the market are important for accurately assessing the aggregate and distributional 
impact of each policy and even more so for evaluating policy efficiency. To our 
knowledge, this is the first paper to incorporate into an equilibrium model both a micro-
founded demand for nursing home care and competitive nursing homes. The analysis 
that comes closest in spirit to ours is by Hackmann (2019), who structurally estimates 
an equilibrium model of nursing home market, but with a reduced-form demand for 
nursing home care. 
This paper builds on important existing works on the LTSS policy. Among the 
studies focusing on the supply side, Nyman (1985), Gertler (1989), Grabowski (2001), 
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and Hackmann (2019) study the effects of a Medicaid reimbursement-rate increase; 
Ching, Hayashi, and Wang (2015) examines the role of the quantity restriction through 
the certificate-of-needs policy; Hackmann (2019) considers promoting more competition 
through a nursing home’s incentivized entry into a market. Among the studies focusing 
on the demand side, De Nardi, French, and Jones (2016), Mommaerts (2018), and 
Achou (2020) study the role of Medicaid generosity for households; Ettner (1994) and 
Stabile, Laporte, and Coyte (2006) examine Medicaid home-care benefits. 
To date, few models study equilibrium on the nursing home market. Ching, 
Hayashi, and Wang (2015) and Hackmann (2019) structurally estimate both the 
demand and supply curves of the market and run counterfactual experiments. 
Compared to these papers, our contributions are twofold. First, while those papers 
capture HCBC as an outside option with a constant utility value, we explicitly model the 
trade-offs households face in choosing between a nursing home and HCBC. As a result, 
in our analysis, LTSS policies affect how households with different characteristics select 
into LTC options. Second, unlike these papers, we solve stochastic dynamic 
optimizations of the entire elderly population. LTSS policies affect households’ saving 
patterns prior to the realization of their LTC needs, which in turn influences the 
characteristics and decisions of LTC consumers. 
This paper also relates to the literature that studies the substitutability between 
nursing home care and HCBC, where the latter is often supported by family help. 
Papers that examine this substitutability empirically include Mommaerts (2016), 
Mommaerts (2018), and Barczyk and Kredler (2019). Barczyk and Kredler (2018) 
proposes a structural model that captures the strategic motives behind family 
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caregiving. Our model contributes to this literature by showing that the substitutability 
between nursing home care and HCBC, which varies with household characteristics, is 
a key determinant in the welfare and distributional effects of LTSS policies. 
Lastly, this paper also connects to the literature that uses structural models to 
study old-age risks and decisions, such as precautionary savings (e.g., De Nardi, 
French, and Jones 2010; Ameriks et al. 2011; Kopecky and Koreshkova 2014; Ameriks 
et al. forthcoming) and demand for public and private LTC insurance (e.g., Brown and 
Finkelstein 2008; Ameriks et al. 2018; Braun, Kopecky, and Koreshkova 2019). Our 
model augments a standard life-cycle model used in this literature with explicit modeling 
of LTC decisions, both on the extensive margin (the type of care used) and on the 
intensive margin (the care intensity received at home). We also extend the standard 
models by incorporating interactions between the demand and supply of long-term care. 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we show the 
empirical patterns of LTC demand and supply that guide our modeling of both sides of 
the market. Section 3 presents a stylized, static model of the LTC market to illustrate the 
main mechanisms at work. Section 4 builds a full-fledged structural model of the LTC 
market, and Section 5 discusses the calibration strategy. Section 6 shows the outcomes 
of four LTSS policy experiments. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Empirical patterns of long-term care demand and supply 
In this section, we examine the empirical patterns of LTC demand and supply. 
Heterogeneity of LTC demand over age, health, family status, and financial resources 
motivate our structural model of LTC choice. Key empirical facts regarding nursing 
homes help discipline the supply side of our model. 
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2.1 Demand 
We use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data, a biennial survey of a 
representative sample of the U.S. population older than 50, to examine the empirical 
patterns of LTC demand. We analyze both the extensive margin — which households 
are more likely to use nursing homes versus HCBC — as well as the intensive margin 
— the number of care hours they use — of LTC choice. We consider the number of 
care hours used as the measure of the “intensity” of long-term care in this paper. We 
use pooled data from waves 2004-2014, where we can find consistent questions in 
particular on the number of care hours respondents receive when they need help with 
the activities of daily living (ADLs). We use the sample of respondents in their 80s, as 
this is the age range with the largest number of respondents needing help with ADLs. 
We define individuals’ health status based on how many ADLs they need help 
with. We use five basic ADLs: eating, bathing, dressing, walking across a room, and 
getting in or out of bed. We classify those who need help with more than three ADLs as 
being in “high needs of help with ADLs” (ADLH). Those who need help with one or two 
ADLs are classified as “low needs of help with ADLs” (ADLL). For the type of care used, 
individuals who receive help with ADLs but not in a nursing home are considered using 
HCBC. Lastly, for the number of care hours used, for those on HCBC, we add the 
number from each helper listed in the HRS. For those in a nursing home, we record it as 
2,000 hours per year following the literature (e.g., Mommaerts 2016). 
Own health and availability of family support matter significantly for the choice of 
care type as well as the intensity of care. Table 1’s Panel A shows that, unsurprisingly, 
those who need help with more ADLs receive a larger number of care hours. The care 
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hours under ADLH is three times larger than under ADLL at the median; the mean is 
twice as large. Own health also affects the care type used. Nursing homes typically do 
not provide much flexibility in the care set up. Their set up is mostly calibrated for those 
needing relatively intensive care, which is not an attractive option for those who can 
manage to do three or more ADLs on their own. Hence, the vast majority use HCBC 
under ADLL, while about one-third enter a nursing home under ADLH. 
Conditional on own health, availability of family support also affects individuals’ 
choices. We classify those with (i) a living spouse who does not need help with ADLs or 
(ii) a child within 10 miles as “with family support.”3 Panel B of Table 1 tabulates the 
LTC demand patterns by family status, conditional on being under ADLH.4 The choice 
of the type of care used strongly depends on the availability of family support. For those 
who do have family support, about one-third of them choose to use HCBC, while more 
than half of those without family support enter a nursing home. The average number of 
care hours is larger with family support, which is particularly driven by the distribution’s 
fat right tail. For those without family support, the distribution is bunched at 2,000 hours, 
which is the imputed value for nursing-home care.  
                                               
3 We found that having a child but not within 10 miles does not have much impact on LTC 
demand patterns. 
4 We focus on the demand conditional on ADLH from this point, as there is not much variation in 
the care type used under ADLL as Panel A shows. We do, however, make sure that the 
demand patterns from our model match the empirical patterns conditional on ADLL as well. 
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Table 1: LTC demand over health and family status 
 Care hours used   
 25p 50p 75p Mean HCBC (%) N 
A. Health       
ADLH 1,188 2,000 3,720 2,574 69 1,723 
ADLL 288 744 2,000 1,355 89 1,205 
B. Family status (conditional on being ADLH)   
With family support 1,116 2,000 4,320 2,723 73 1,409 
Without family support 900 2,000 2,000 2,042 49 314 
Note: Hours is the number of care hours received per year. Being in a nursing home is coded 
as 2,000 hours per year. Individuals who have a living spouse who does not need help with 
ADLs or have a child within 10 miles is considered to have family support. 
Financial resources also affect the LTC demand patterns though their effect is 
smaller than that of family support. Table 2 shows the share of those using HCBC and 
the mean number of care hours received, conditional on income and wealth quartiles, 
family support, and being under ADLH. The impact of financial resources is more 
noticeable on the care type used (Panel A), where the share of HCBC has an inverted 
U-shape over income and wealth. The pattern is noisier for the number of hours. It 
should be noted that the small number of observations after conditioning on wealth and 
income quartiles — in particular, for those without family support — make the means 
more sensitive to outliers. 
In the model we develop, we try to capture the key patterns presented. A much 
higher share of HCBC among those with family support means that the effective cost of 
using HCBC is much lower for them. This mostly reflects informal care provided by the 
family members. In our model, individuals without family support face a trade-off 
between the flexibility of HCBC and the cheaper cost of care (per hour) received at a 
nursing home. The inverted U-shape of the share of HCBC over financial resources will 
be generated as an outcome of this trade-off. 
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Table 2: LTC demand over wealth and income 
A. HCBC (%) Wealth quartiles  Income quartiles 
Family structure 1st 2nd 3rd 4th  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Without family support 35 66 74 55  47 50 52 49 
With family support 67 76 82 79  74 72 73 77 
B. Hours (Mean) Wealth quartiles  Income quartiles 
Family structure 1st 2nd 3rd 4th  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Without family support 2,019 2,168 2,389 1,704  2,122 2,121 1,700 2,149 
With family support 2,808 2,649 2,884 2,420  2,914 2,531 2,594 2,874 
Note: This table tabulates the demand patterns conditional on being under ADLH. N=314 for 
those without family support; N=1,409 for those with family support. Also see notes for Table 1. 
2.2 Supply 
To obtain basic facts regarding local competitions in the nursing home market, 
we use the Pennsylvania Department of Health’s Nursing Home Reports, which cover 
the universe of nursing homes in Pennsylvania.5 We also use some moments reported 
in Hackmann (2019) that are also from the nursing homes in Pennsylvania. 
Hackmann (2019) reports that 90% of nursing home entrants travel less than 15 
miles/23 kilometers to find a nursing home. Based on this, we set the size of one 
nursing home market to be 700 square miles, the size of a circle with a radius of 15 
miles. According to the Nursing Home Reports data, there are, on average, 11 nursing 
homes per each nursing home market. Using census data, we also find that there are 
24,000 people 70 or older per nursing home market. Our quantitative model represents 
one nursing home market, and hence we calibrate the number of nursing homes and 
the size of the elderly population to match these facts. There are 90,000 beds in total in 
all 700 nursing homes in Pennsylvania, so on average, each nursing home has about 
                                               




130 beds. This number is not explicitly targeted in our model, but we check that the 
average size of nursing homes in our model matches this number. 
According to the Nursing Home Reports, the average out-of-pocket costs of 
using a nursing home’s semi-private room is about $85,000 per year.6 Note that a 
nursing home provides not only health and personal care but also other amenities, 
including a room, food, cleaning service, etc.7 Considering this, and also that the per-
hour cost of intensive HCBC is about $35 (Mommaerts 2016), a nursing home is a 
cheaper option for those who demand intensive long-term care but do not have family 
support, as they also need to outsource basic home production.8 This reflects that 
nursing homes can provide intensive care at a lower unit cost compared to HCBC, 
which is made possible by the nursing home’s institutional setup and care 
standardization. Our model captures this feature as increasing returns to scale over the 
intensity of care in the nursing home cost function. 
Hackmann (2019) documents that the Medicaid reimbursement rate is about 
$76,500, which is 10% lower than the out-of-pocket price from the Nursing Home 
Reports. He also reports that a nursing home’s average fixed operational cost is about 
$1.3 million per year. Our quantitative model will generate the observed out-of-pocket 
price as the optimal price chosen by nursing homes facing the documented Medicaid 
reimbursement rate. Each nursing home in our model will have profits enough to cover 
                                               
6 This paper uses 2017 dollars. 
7 Hackmann (2019) reports that the nonhealth-related resident cost is about one-third of the 
health-related cost. 
8 See Section 5 for more details of the cost comparisons across different LTC options. 
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the fixed operational costs but not too much to allow for a profitable entry of an 
additional nursing home. 
3. A static model of the long-term care market 
In this section, we propose a simple model of nursing home market, featuring 
optimizing consumers and producers, with a purpose of establishing intuition for the 
large quantitative model presented in the next section. Starting with the demand side, 
we characterize the demands for nursing home care: The private demand and the 
demand of Medicaid enrollees’ (hereafter “Medicaid nursing home demand”). Then we 
examine the nursing home decisions given the care demands, and highlight the role of 
Medicaid in the incentives on both sides of the market. 
Consider a closed community of individuals who need long-term care. They can 
obtain this care either at home (HCBC) or by moving to a nursing home. The two types 
of care differ in flexibility and prices, taken as given by an individual. While the intensity 
of care received at home is flexible and decided by an individual, a nursing home 
provides a uniform intensity to all residents. Individuals in a community are 
heterogeneous in wealth and the effective HCBC price. The latter is intended to capture 
the availability of informal care by family members. 
There is a single nursing home operated by a monopolist. The monopolist 
observes the distribution of individuals and their Medicaid eligibility, and perfectly 
predicts the aggregate demand when deciding the price and care intensity. 
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3.1 The demand side 
Individual preferences are defined over consumption of care services 𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘 of type 
𝑘𝑘 ∈ {𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁} and noncare goods 𝑐𝑐: 
𝑈𝑈𝑘𝑘 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘) + 𝑣𝑣(𝑐𝑐), 
where 𝑢𝑢(. ) and 𝑣𝑣(. ) are increasing, continuous, twice continuously differentiable, and 
concave. For expositional purposes in this section, we assume that preferences are 
also homothetic. Individual resources consist of wealth 𝜔𝜔 and government transfers 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘 
for care 𝑘𝑘, which are allocated between expenditures on care, 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘, and noncare 
goods: 
𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘 + 𝑐𝑐 = 𝜔𝜔 + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘. 
The cost of 𝑞𝑞 hours of HCBC at a price 𝜌𝜌 per hour is 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 = 𝜌𝜌𝑞𝑞, and the cost of a 
nursing home stay, which comes with fixed intensity 𝑄𝑄, is 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 = 𝑃𝑃. 
We first examine the care decision in the absence of public assistance for long-
term care (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅𝑘𝑘 = 0, ∀𝑘𝑘). The optimal intensity of out-of-pocket HCBC, 𝑞𝑞, satisfies the 
first-order condition: 
 𝑢𝑢′(𝑞𝑞) = 𝜌𝜌𝑣𝑣′(𝜔𝜔 − 𝜌𝜌𝑞𝑞). 
                    (1) 
Utility attained under HCBC determines the reservation utility for a potential nursing 
home entrant: 
 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻(𝜔𝜔,𝜌𝜌) ≡ 𝑢𝑢(𝑞𝑞) + 𝑣𝑣(𝜔𝜔 − 𝜌𝜌𝑞𝑞). 
(2) 
Both the optimal out-of-pocket HCBC and the reservation utility are increasing in wealth 
and declining in the price of HCBC. 
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3.1.1 Private demand for nursing home care 
Taking as given nursing home care intensity, 𝑄𝑄, and bed price , 𝑃𝑃, an individual 
chooses nursing home care if the utility attained in a nursing home exceeds her 
reservation utility: 
 𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁(𝜔𝜔,𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄) = 𝑢𝑢(𝑄𝑄) + 𝑣𝑣(𝜔𝜔 − 𝑃𝑃) ≥ 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻(𝜔𝜔,𝜌𝜌). 
(3) 
For each individual wealth level 𝜔𝜔, the participation constraint (Equation 3) 
determines the reservation level of nursing home intensity 𝒬𝒬(𝜔𝜔,𝑃𝑃,𝜌𝜌), such that for 𝑄𝑄 >
𝒬𝒬(𝜔𝜔,𝑃𝑃,𝜌𝜌) the individual strictly prefers nursing home, and for 𝑄𝑄 < 𝒬𝒬(𝜔𝜔,𝑃𝑃,𝜌𝜌) they prefer 
HCBC. The marginal individuals — those with binding participation constraints, 𝑄𝑄 =
𝒬𝒬(𝜔𝜔,𝑃𝑃,𝜌𝜌) — determine the demand schedule faced by the nursing home. Hence the 
properties of the demand for nursing home care can be derived from the properties of 
the reservation intensity function. 
Proposition 1 
The reservation intensity 𝒬𝒬(𝜔𝜔,𝑃𝑃, 𝜌𝜌) is U-shaped in wealth, increasing in the price 
of the nursing home and declining in the price of HCBC.9 
Our quantitative model will distinguish between two types of individuals, with and 
without family support, to capture the fact that households with able spouses and/or a 
child nearby face a lower price of HCBC compared to a single individual without a child 
living nearby: 𝜌𝜌𝐹𝐹 < 𝜌𝜌𝑆𝑆. Figure 1a considers two such individuals, whose optimal HCBC 
allocations are indicated by points 𝑆𝑆 and 𝐹𝐹. The indifference curves passing through 
those points correspond to their participation constraints (Equation 3). Any nursing 
                                               
9 For the proofs of the propositions in this paper, please see the Online Appendix at 
https://sites.google.com/site/minjoonlee/research/MRDRC_AppendixB.pdf. 
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home intensity-price combination that delivers a point above the indifference curve is 
accepted. A nursing home charging price 𝑃𝑃 would have to deliver at least 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆 for the 
single individual, and at least 𝑄𝑄𝐹𝐹 for the one with family. A nursing home with an 
intensity-price offer associated with point 𝑁𝑁 is accepted by the single individual, but not 
by the individual with family. 
Figure 1: Extensive margins of demand 
                 (a) HCBC-price margin                                        (b) Wealth margin 
  
Figure 1b illustrates how the reservation intensity of nursing home care changes 
with wealth level given nursing home price 𝑃𝑃 and intensity 𝑄𝑄 in a community of 
individuals facing the same HCBC price (e.g., single individuals without family support). 
Each point of the reservation intensity curve is found similarly to Figure 1a: For each 
level of wealth 𝜔𝜔, locate a point with noncare consumption (𝜔𝜔 − 𝑃𝑃) on the HCBC 
indifference curve (the participation constraint). For the marginal individuals — those 
with wealth levels 𝜔𝜔�(𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄|𝜌𝜌) and 𝜔𝜔�(𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄|𝜌𝜌) — the participation constraint is binding: 𝑄𝑄 =
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𝒬𝒬(𝜔𝜔�,𝑃𝑃,𝜌𝜌) = 𝒬𝒬(𝜔𝜔�,𝑃𝑃,𝜌𝜌). Individuals with 𝜔𝜔 ∈ (𝜔𝜔�,𝜔𝜔�) are strictly better off at the nursing 
home. The reservation intensity for an individual with wealth level 𝜔𝜔𝐴𝐴 is equal to his 
optimal HCBC intensity, which also corresponds to the minimum of the reservation 
intensities across the wealth distribution, given care prices 𝑃𝑃 and 𝜌𝜌. Homothetic 
preferences imply that the minimum of all acceptable intensity levels equalizes the unit 
price of care: 𝒬𝒬(𝜔𝜔𝐴𝐴,𝑃𝑃, 𝜌𝜌) = 𝑞𝑞 = 𝑃𝑃
𝜌𝜌
. Notice that nursing home intensity exceeds the 
optimal HCBC intensity for individuals with wealth below 𝜔𝜔𝐵𝐵, and is below the optimal 
HCBC intensity for wealthier individuals. 
The reservation intensity curve makes it clear how the pool of nursing home 
residents changes as a nursing home varies its intensity: Higher intensity attracts more 
residents at both ends of the wealth spectrum. HCBC is used by poorer individuals, who 
cannot afford the nursing home and have make do with little care, and by richer 
individuals, who demand higher care intensity. 
Let the distribution of individuals be continuous over the support 𝜔𝜔 ∈ [𝜔𝜔,𝜔𝜔‾ ] with 
cdf 𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝜔𝜔) and a continuous positive pdf 𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖(𝜔𝜔), 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑆𝑆,𝐹𝐹}. Let 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖 be the share of 
individuals with HCBC price 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖. Given these assumptions and Proposition 1, the 
following proposition formally states the private demand for nursing home and 
characterizes its properties. 
Proposition 2 
The private demand for nursing home care by individuals of type 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝑆𝑆,𝐹𝐹} can be 
written as follows: 
 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖(𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄) = 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖[𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝜔𝜔�𝑖𝑖) − 𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖(𝜔𝜔�𝑖𝑖)], 
(4) 
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where wealth levels of the marginal individuals, {𝜔𝜔�𝑖𝑖,𝜔𝜔�𝑖𝑖}, solve Equation 3 at equality for 
each (𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄,𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖), such that 𝜔𝜔�𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝜔𝜔�𝑖𝑖. The demand has standard properties: it decreases in 




> 0, and 𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖
> 0. 
Figure 2a shows the allocation of care in the space of wealth and the HCBC 
price. Nursing home is never chosen by individuals whose price of HCBC is below the 
unit price of nursing home care, 𝜌𝜌 < 𝑃𝑃
𝜕𝜕
.10 
Figure 2. Allocation of care given the price and intensity of nursing homes 
                       (a) No Medicaid                                             (b) With Medicaid 
  
3.1.2 Nursing home demand with Medicaid 
Consider a Medicaid LTSS policy that pays for a nursing home of given intensity 
𝑄𝑄 and provides individual with consumption floor 𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀.11 We assume that the policy pays 
                                               
10 In the quantitative model, we allow for preference shocks that introduce a random component 
to the choice of care so that some individuals with low price of HCBC prefer nursing home 
care. 
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for the same amount of HCBC. For expositional purposes, we also assume the same 
consumption floor provided by Medicaid in the HCBC setting, making a Medicaid 
enrollee indifferent between a nursing home and HCBC. Without loss of generality, here 
we allocate those individuals to nursing home care. 
To enroll in Medicaid LTSS program, an individual must require long-term care 
and his resources must be insufficient to achieve the consumption floor on his own 
conditional on receiving nursing home care. To receive Medicaid transfers, all individual 
wealth must be forfeited. 
An individual chooses among three options: HCBC (𝑘𝑘 = 𝐻𝐻), out-of-pocket nursing 
home care (𝑘𝑘 = 𝑁𝑁), and Medicaid nursing home (𝑘𝑘 = 𝑀𝑀): 
 
max{𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻(𝜔𝜔,𝜌𝜌),𝑈𝑈𝑁𝑁(𝜔𝜔,𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄),𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀(𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀,𝑄𝑄)}, (5) 
where 𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀(𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀,𝑄𝑄) = 𝑢𝑢(𝑄𝑄) + 𝑣𝑣(𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀). 
Conditional of using a nursing home, the choice between Medicaid and OOP 
option is trivial: Medicaid is preferred if 𝜔𝜔 < 𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀 + 𝑃𝑃. Among individuals who would 
choose HCBC in the absence of Medicaid, being a Medicaid nursing home resident is 
preferred by those with high HCBC price relative to individual resources. That is, not all 
individuals eligible for Medicaid choose Medicaid nursing home. Figure 3a shows the 
indifference curve corresponding to the utility delivered by the Medicaid stay at the 
nursing home. The points on the indifference curve correspond to marginal individuals 
                                                                                                                                                   
11 This set up differs from the quantitative model featuring fixed consumption value of nursing 
home. The discrepancy is due to the static versus dynamic setup and for the ease of 
exposition: In the static model, we abstract from the consumption value of nursing home and 
interpret private residents’ consumption as capturing the bequest value of their wealth. To be 
able to examine effects of Medicaid generosity in the static model, 𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀 has to be one of the 
Medicaid policy parameters. 
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characterized by the combination of their resources and HCBC price, (𝜔𝜔,𝜌𝜌). Consider 
the steepest budget constraint (the lowest HCBC price): Individuals with wealth below 𝜔𝜔 
strictly prefer a Medicaid stay at the nursing home to HCBC. As the HCBC price 
increases, wealthier individuals switch from HCBC to Medicaid nursing home stay. 
Formal derivation of the Medicaid-HCBC frontier — a locus of points (𝜔𝜔, 𝜌𝜌) such that 
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻(𝜔𝜔,𝜌𝜌) = 𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀(𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀,𝑄𝑄) — is provided in the Appendix and its properties are illustrated 
below. 
Figure 2b shows the care allocation in the HCBC price-wealth space, given the 
intensity and price of nursing home, as well as the consumption value of Medicaid 
nursing home. Consider two levels of HCBC prices: 𝜌𝜌𝐹𝐹 < 𝑃𝑃/𝑄𝑄 (with family) and 𝜌𝜌𝑆𝑆 >
𝑃𝑃/𝑄𝑄 (single, without family). For singles, poor individuals rely on Medicaid, middle-
income individuals choose OOP nursing home, and the rest use HCBC. For individuals 
with family, poor use Medicaid nursing home and the rest use relatively cheap HCBC. 
For the rest of this subsection, we focus on these two types of individuals, with wealth 
levels such that the marginal tradeoff is between the Medicaid nursing home and 
HCBC, i.e., 𝜔𝜔 < 𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀 + 𝑃𝑃. 
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Figure 3: Choice between HCBC and Medicaid nursing home 
(a) Allocation given the intensity of 
nursing home care 
(b) Effects of increase in the  
                intensity of nursing home care 
  
As the utility of a Medicaid nursing home stay increases, either due to higher 
care intensity or higher Medicaid consumption floor, the Medicaid option becomes 
attractive to individuals with more resources at each HCBC price level. Figure 3b shows 
the increase in Medicaid nursing home demand for the case of higher intensity. At any 
given HCBC price, the wealth of individuals willing to switch to the Medicaid nursing 
home increases. Figure 4a shows the overall increase in demand for Medicaid nursing 
home due to higher consumption floor. Increasing nursing home care intensity has a 
qualitatively similar effect on the choice between Medicaid nursing home versus HCBC 
(Figure 4b). However, as discussed in Section 3.1.1, higher nursing home intensity also 
expands the pool of out-of-pocket residents as individuals switch from HCBC to out-of-
pocket nursing home on both side of the wealth spectrum. Finally, an increase in the 
nursing home bed price has the opposite effect on the private demand for nursing 
home, but has no effect on the Medicaid-HCBC frontier (Figure 4c). 
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Figure 4: Effects of changes in Medicaid eligibility, Medicaid consumption, and 
price of nursing home on the demand for care 
(a) More generous Medicaid (increase in 𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀) 
 




Given the assumptions on the distribution of agents made in Section 3.1.1, the 
following propositions formally state the Medicaid demand and summarize its 
properties. 
Proposition 3 
The Medicaid demand for nursing home by individuals of type 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝐹𝐹, 𝑆𝑆} can be 
stated as 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖(𝑄𝑄|𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀) = 𝜓𝜓𝑖𝑖𝛷𝛷𝑖𝑖[𝜔𝜔𝑀𝑀(𝑄𝑄|𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀,𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖)], (6) 
where 𝜔𝜔𝑀𝑀(𝑄𝑄|𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀,𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖) < 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 + 𝑃𝑃 is the wealth of the marginal individual of type 𝑖𝑖 who is 
indifferent between out-of-pocket HCBC and Medicaid nursing home, with 
𝜔𝜔𝑀𝑀(𝑄𝑄|𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀,𝜌𝜌𝐹𝐹) < 𝜔𝜔𝑀𝑀(𝑄𝑄|𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀,𝜌𝜌𝑆𝑆). 
Proposition 4 
Let 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 be the optimal HCBC intensity of individual of type 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝐹𝐹, 𝑆𝑆}, with wealth 
𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀 such that 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻(𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀,𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖) = 𝑈𝑈𝑀𝑀(𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀,𝑄𝑄). The Medicaid demand of individuals of type 𝑖𝑖 ∈
{𝐹𝐹, 𝑆𝑆} has the following properties: 






≥ 0. (7) 






> 0.  (8) 
The slope of the Medicaid demand over intensity increases with the Medicaid 
generosity if either the density margin is non-negative or the preference margin 























To sum up, the aggregate demand for nursing home care consists of private 
payers’ demand and Medicaid enrollees’ demand. Private payers are individuals in the 
middle range of the wealth distribution, for whom nursing home care intensity is close to 
what they would have chosen under out-of-pocket HCBC. Medicaid allows poor 
individuals, who are priced out of nursing home care, to achieve higher levels of care 
relative to out-of-pocket HCBC. While the number of private residents can be controlled 
with both price and intensity of nursing home care, Medicaid demand only responds to 
the latter. 
3.2 The supply side 
3.2.1 Nursing home problem 
We now consider the decisions of a monopolistic nursing home that takes as 
given the demand for beds studied above. The nursing home chooses price and care 
intensity. We assume that care intensity is a public good: The nursing home cannot 
discriminate among the residents on intensity. We also rule out price discrimination. 
Although the nursing home cannot deny a bed to a Medicaid resident, it can still control 
the Medicaid demand for its beds by varying the care intensity. The nursing home takes 
as given the reimbursement rate, 𝑀𝑀 < 𝑃𝑃, set and paid by Medicaid, In this sense, it acts 
as a partial price-taker.12 
                                               
12 If servicing all qualifying residents implies negative profits, the nursing home does not 
operate. 
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The nursing home faces the cost schedule 𝐶𝐶(𝑁𝑁,𝑄𝑄), where 𝑁𝑁 = 𝑛𝑛 + 𝑚𝑚 is the total 
number of beds, with the following properties: The marginal cost of bed 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 is increasing 
in the number of beds and intensity (𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 > 0, 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝜕𝜕 > 0), and the marginal cost of a unit 
of intensity (an hour of care) is nonincreasing in the total intensity (𝐶𝐶𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ≤ 0). These 
assumptions are consistent with nursing home capacity constraints and potential 
increasing returns to scale in intensity due to centralized care provision.13 
The nursing home chooses price and intensity taking as given aggregate private 
demand 𝑛𝑛(𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄) ≡ ∑ 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=𝑆𝑆,𝐹𝐹 (𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄|𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖) and aggregate Medicaid demand 𝑚𝑚(𝑄𝑄|𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀) = ∑𝑖𝑖=𝑆𝑆,𝐹𝐹
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 (𝑄𝑄|𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀,𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖): 
 
  𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚(𝑄𝑄|𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀) + 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛(𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄) − 𝐶𝐶(𝑛𝑛(𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄) + 𝑚𝑚(𝑄𝑄),𝑄𝑄).𝑃𝑃,𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚  (10) 
The first-order conditions for price and intensity are: 














The terms in parentheses correspond to profit margins: (𝑃𝑃 − 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁) is the marginal profit 
on a private bed and (𝑀𝑀− 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁) is the marginal profit on a Medicaid bed, which we 
assume to be positive. Equation 11 ensures that, at the optimum, the benefit of 
increasing price by $1 on each of 𝑛𝑛 private residents (the right-hand side) equals the 
profit loss due to residents forgoing nursing home in favor of relatively cheaper HCBC 
(the left-hand-side). Equation 12 weighs the cost of increasing intensity by 1 hour (the 
right-hand side) against the benefits: marginal profits generated by the additional 
                                               
13 These assumptions are consistent with the results of our calibration procedure for the 
quantitative model, which does not preimpose these conditions (see Section 5). 
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demand for nursing home care (the left-hand-side) from both private and Medicaid 
residents attracted by higher intensity.14 
3.2.2 The role of Medicaid 
One of this paper’s main goals is to understand how Medicaid affects the nursing 
home market: care intensity, bed price, number of beds, distribution of residents, and 
overall welfare. Although assessing many of these effects requires a quantitative 
analysis, this section highlights the channels underlying the nursing home incentives, as 
well as identifies unambiguous effects whenever possible. 
In our analysis, two policy variables characterize Medicaid: the reimbursement 
rate 𝑀𝑀 on the supply side and the consumption floor 𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀 on the demand side. Moreover, 
Medicaid enforces a rule which does not allow a nursing home to reject an eligible 
resident. 
Suppose there exists a market equilibrium where a nursing home makes positive 
profits given Medicaid policy (𝑀𝑀, 𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀). Now consider a more generous Medicaid policy 
first on the supply side, then on the demand side. 
Medicaid generosity on the supply side 
Consider an increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate 𝑀𝑀. The policy change 
directly increases the profit margin on Medicaid bed on the left-hand-side of Equation 
12. Higher return on Medicaid beds induces nursing home to supply higher care 
intensity in order to attract more Medicaid residents. Higher intensity also increases the 
private demand. Decreasing returns to the bed numbers imply that higher number of 
                                               
14 Without Medicaid residents, the solution to the monopolist problem is standard and may 
feature under- or oversupply of intensity relative to the competitive outcome, depending on the 
private demand elasticities with respect to intensity. 
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residents, together with higher intensity, raises the marginal cost of bed, 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁(𝑛𝑛 + 𝑚𝑚,𝑄𝑄), 
and reduces profit margins on both types of beds. Holding the slope of the private 
demand, 𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃
, constant, lower profit margin on a private bed reduces the marginal cost of 
raising the bed price (the left-hand-side of Equation 11), while larger numbers of private 
payers increases return to raising the price (the right-hand-side of Equation 11). 
However, whether the price increases depends on how the slopes of the demand 
responds to higher intensity, i.e., on the sign of 𝜕𝜕
2𝑛𝑛
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
. Furthermore, increasing returns to 
scale in intensity reduce the marginal costs of extra care hour, further raising care 
intensity. While it is unambiguous that both the number of Medicaid beds and care 
intensity increase, the effects on the number and price of private beds are ambiguous. 
Both nursing homes and their Medicaid residents stand to benefit from the higher 
reimbursement rate while the private LTC consumer may be disadvantaged. 
Medicaid generosity on demand side 
Now consider an increase in the consumption floor for Medicaid nursing home 
residents, 𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑀. Proposition 4(Equation 8) states that higher consumption floor stimulates 
the demand for nursing home care and increases the number of residents, holding all 
else constant. This inflow of Medicaid residents has a direct impact on the marginal cost 
of bed, 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁, and of an extra care hour, 𝐶𝐶𝜕𝜕, which reduce the profit margins on both types 
of beds and reduce incentives to provide higher intensity. At the same time, there are 
two channels that promote higher intensity: higher demand elasticities with respect to 
intensity and lower marginal cost of intensity. The former property has been discussed 
in Proposition 4 (Equation 9): A higher consumption floor amplifies the response of the 
Medicaid demand to intensity provided the loss on the density margin is small or non-
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negative. The latter channel arises due to the assumption of increasing returns to scale 
in intensity. In the end, the effect on intensity is ambiguous. On the other hand, the price 
unambiguously increases and the number of private beds falls as the cost of raising the 
price on private beds declines. To sum up, more generous policy on the demand side 
crowds out private beds with Medicaid beds and increases the bed price, while its effect 
on intensity and nursing home profits is ambiguous. 
Thus, Medicaid generosity targeted at either demand or supply side affects both 
sides of the nursing home market. Both policies increase the share of Medicaid beds 
and, hence, increase Medicaid outlays. Higher Medicaid reimbursement rates directly 
benefit nursing homes with some of the benefits being passed on to the existing and 
new residents in terms of higher care intensity. A higher consumption floor directly 
benefits existing Medicaid nursing home residents, as well as those who switch from 
out-of-pocket HCBC to Medicaid nursing home in terms of consumption, but has 
ambiguous effects on care intensity used. 
4. Quantitative model 
Our quantitative model extends the stylized model in the following ways. On the 
household side, the optimization problem is dynamic. Households make saving 
decisions and value bequests. Households face stochastic health transitions and 
mortality risk as they get older. They also face preference shocks that capture the role 
of the factors not explicitly captured in our modeling of LTC choice (e.g., distance of a 
nursing home from their family). On the supply side, we explicitly capture the local 
competition among nursing homes and allow for a rich cost structure. 
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4.1 Households 
Households in our model are heterogeneous in their age, wealth, income, family 
structure, and health. We first describe the choices households make in each period 
given this state. Then we present the full dynamic problem by explaining how the state 
evolves over time. 
4.1.1 Optimization problem in each period 
State variables: In each period, the following state variables summarize a 
household’s current status: 
1. Age (𝑡𝑡): For simplicity, for couples, we assume that they have the same 
age. 
2. Family situation (𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑): This captures the following information: (i) whether 
the male and female spouses are alive or not; (ii) whether the household 
has a living child or not; (iii) if there is a living child, whether the household 
has a child within 10 miles or not. 
3. Wealth (𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑): The total value of wealth owned by the household.15 
4. Income (𝐘𝐘𝑑𝑑 = {𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑,𝑌𝑌𝑝𝑝,𝑑𝑑}): This captures the retirement income from Social 
Security and defined-benefit pensions for the household’s living members. 
It is a vector with two elements, capturing income of male (𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑) and 
female (𝑌𝑌𝑝𝑝,𝑑𝑑) separately. 
5. Permanent income (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃): This captures the average earnings made while 
household members were working. 
                                               
15 For tractability, we do not distinguish housing and financial wealth. 
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6. Health (𝐡𝐡𝑑𝑑 = {ℎ𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑,ℎ𝑝𝑝,𝑑𝑑}): This captures the health status of the 
household’s living members. Potential values it can take are good (𝐺𝐺), bad 
(𝐵𝐵), low need for help with the ADLs (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿), and high need for help with 
the ADLs (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻). Being Good and Bad has no difference in terms of the 
current demand for long-term care (which is zero), but it affects the health 
transition probabilities.16 It is a vector with two elements, capturing health 
of male (ℎ𝑚𝑚,𝑑𝑑) and female (ℎ𝑝𝑝,𝑑𝑑) separately. 
In describing the household choice problem below, to simplify the notation, we 
drop the age subscript. The variables without a prime (′) are the current-period 
variables, while the ones with a prime is the next-period variables. 
Flow utility function: Households face the following flow utility function: 
 𝑈𝑈(𝐜𝐜,𝐪𝐪,𝐤𝐤;𝐡𝐡, 𝛏𝛏,𝐹𝐹) ≡ � 1𝑔𝑔
𝑔𝑔=𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝
[𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔ℎ(𝑢𝑢(𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘;ℎ𝑔𝑔) + 𝜉𝜉𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘) + 𝜈𝜈(𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 + 𝛥𝛥𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘)]. 
(13) 
1𝑔𝑔 is the indicator function that takes the value of one if the member of the 
corresponding gender is alive, and zero otherwise. For couples, this is the sum of the 
utilities of two members. Each member’s flow utility is composed of two terms: utility 
from LTC consumption (the first term inside the bracket) and that from noncare 
consumption (the second term). 
Care consumption’s relative importance of is governed by the utility multiplier, 𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔ℎ. 
This parameter depends on the current health. In particular, it is zero when the health is 
𝐺𝐺 or 𝐵𝐵 (because we do not explicitly model health care other than long-term care), while 
                                               
16 In mapping these categories to the HRS, Good is defined as not needing help with ADLs and 
the self-reported health status being excellent, very good, or good. Bad is defined as not 
needing help with ADLs and the self-reported health status being fair or poor. 
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it takes positive values when the health is 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 or 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻. 𝑢𝑢 is an increasing and 
concave function of the hours of care received (𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘) and the superscript 𝑘𝑘 refers to the 
type of care chosen (see below). Note that we allow the health state to affect not only 
𝜃𝜃𝑔𝑔ℎ but also 𝑢𝑢, to capture the possibility that the subsistence level of long-term care may 
be different between 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻. 𝜉𝜉𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘 is a preference shock. Households draw one 
preference shock for each care option available. This preference shock allows 
households to take into account factors that are relevant for the care-type choice but not 
explicitly modeled (such as distance from family). Moreover, the preference shock 
allows us to handle local competition in the nursing home market in a simple and 
tractable way. The distributions are independent across care options and drawn from an 
exponential distribution with a variance of 𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉2.17 
The noncare utility function, 𝜈𝜈, is increasing and concave in the noncare 
consumption, 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 + 𝛥𝛥𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘, where 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 is consumption of goods and services purchased and 
𝛥𝛥𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘 is consumption value of staying in a nursing home if the considered member is in a 
nursing home (see below for the latter). 
Care options: When a member’s health is 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 or 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, households can 
choose to either enter a nursing home or use HCBC.18 For each option, households can 
choose to pay out of pocket or to rely on Medicaid. 
                                               
17 To make the choice between entering a nursing home and using HCBC unaffected by the 
number of nursing homes, in calculating the utility from using HCBC, we draw preference 
shocks of the same number as the number of nursing homes and use the largest value. This 
guarantees that households use options that are equally attractive before the preference 
shocks with the same probabilities. 
18 In the case when both members’ health statuses are 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 or 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, we do not allow them to 
choose different care options. Either both enter a nursing home or both use HCBC. This 
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Nursing home 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1,⋯ , 𝐽𝐽} provides 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 hours of care for both out-of-pocket (𝑘𝑘 =
𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑂𝑂) and Medicaid (𝑘𝑘 = 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀) patients. The out-of-pocket cost is 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 per year. Staying in a 
nursing home as a private patient also comes with consumption value, 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂  (assumed to 
be the same across nursing homes). Medicaid patients do not pay out of pocket for 
care, but they forfeit income and wealth above certain thresholds (see the explanations 
on the budget constraint and the transfers below). The consumption value of a Medicaid 
nursing home stay, 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀, can be smaller than 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 . This is to capture the possibility of 
public care aversion (Ameriks et al. 2011) and nursing homes providing fewer amenities 
to public patients. 
The main benefit of using HCBC out of pocket (𝑘𝑘 = 𝐻𝐻𝑂𝑂) is the flexibility in 
choosing the care hours based on one’s needs and preferences. The cost per care hour 
is 𝜌𝜌(𝐹𝐹,𝐡𝐡), so the total cost is 𝜌𝜌(𝐹𝐹,𝐡𝐡)𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔, where 𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔 is the hours of care demanded by the 
individual. Note that the unit price of care depends on the family structure and the health 
status. This allows for the possibility that the effective cost of using HCBC may be lower 
if they have a healthy spouse or a child living nearby. For single households, or for 
those with both spouses needing help with ADLs, they also need to pay for 
housekeeping services. We assume that those households need to pay additional fixed 
cost, 𝛹𝛹, regardless of the number of care hours used. 
For Medicaid-funded HCBC (𝑘𝑘 = 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀), we assume that Medicaid pays up to 
some number of hours, 𝑄𝑄𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀. Because the out-of-pocket price is zero, individuals in the 
model always use the maximum allowed number of hours. Households using this option 
                                                                                                                                                  
shouldn’t have a noticeable impact on the results as it is very rare that both members need 
help with ADLs at the same time, it happens to about 1% of households older than 70. 
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face the same regulation regarding income and wealth to be kept as in the Medicaid 
nursing home option. 
Budget constraint: Households face the following budget constraint: 
 𝑊𝑊′ = (1 + 𝑟𝑟)�𝑊𝑊 + � 𝟏𝟏𝑔𝑔
𝑔𝑔=𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝
�𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔 − 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔 − 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘(𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔,𝐡𝐡,𝐹𝐹)� + 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅� . 
(14) 
The budget constraint defines the evolution of the household beginning-of-period wealth 
𝑊𝑊. It is accumulated with the retirement income net of expenditures and government 
transfers (𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅) associated with Medicaid LTSS programs. Expenditures include 
consumption of noncare goods and services and private care-service costs. The latter 
depends on the health as well as type and quantity of care received: 
 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘(𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔,𝐡𝐡,𝐹𝐹) =  �
𝑃𝑃  if 𝑘𝑘 = 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑂𝑂
𝜌𝜌(𝐡𝐡,𝐹𝐹)𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔 + 𝜓𝜓(h,𝐹𝐹)  if 𝑘𝑘 = 𝐻𝐻𝑂𝑂
0  if 𝑘𝑘 = 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀 ,  𝑘𝑘 = 𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀 , or ℎ𝑔𝑔 ∈ {𝐵𝐵,𝐺𝐺}.
 
The last case indicates that the LTC expenditure is zero when their health is Good or 
Bad, or if they become a Medicaid enrollee. 
Transfers: The transfer term in the budget constraint (Equation 14) captures the 
role of Medicaid. The following rules determine the transfer value in all four potential 
cases: 
• For households that do not receive care based on Medicaid, there is no 
transfer: 
 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 = 0. (15) 
• For households where all the members are Medicaid enrollees, Medicaid 
forfeits households’ entire wealth and income. In addition, a Medicaid 
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enrollee using HCBC receives a consumption transfer which guarantees a 
minimum of noncare consumption (𝛥𝛥𝑊𝑊): 
 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 = � 𝟏𝟏𝑔𝑔
𝑔𝑔=𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝
�𝛥𝛥𝑊𝑊𝐈𝐈𝑘𝑘𝑔𝑔=𝐻𝐻
𝑀𝑀 − 𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔] −𝑊𝑊� . (16) 
• For coupled households where one member (𝑔𝑔 = 𝑖𝑖) is Medicaid LTSS 
enrollee and the other member (𝑔𝑔 = 𝑗𝑗) does not require long-term care, 
households forfeit part of their wealth and income according to the 
following rule. For the income, the healthy spouse can keep the larger 
value between her/his income and a certain lower bound set to prevent 
impoverishment of the healthy spouse (𝑌𝑌). For wealth, the household can 
keep the full amount of its assets up to the threshold 𝑊𝑊, and 50% of 
wealth above 𝑊𝑊. The amount of wealth it can keep cannot be larger than 
𝑊𝑊 + 𝑊𝑊‾ , where 𝑊𝑊‾  is the parameter that puts the upper bound on the 
wealth kept in conjunction with 𝑊𝑊. Hence, the transfer is determined as: 
 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 = 𝛥𝛥𝑊𝑊𝐈𝐈𝑖𝑖
𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖=𝐻𝐻𝑀𝑀 −𝑊𝑊 − � 𝟏𝟏𝑔𝑔
𝑔𝑔=𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝
𝑌𝑌𝑔𝑔 + max{𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗 ,𝑌𝑌}
+min�𝑊𝑊,𝑊𝑊� + max�0,min�0.5�𝑊𝑊 −𝑊𝑊�,𝑊𝑊‾ ��.
 (17) 
For the parameters used to specify the exact Medicaid eligibility criteria (and 
hence the transfers according to the above equations), there are variations across 
states. We calibrate these parameters based on the rule from Pennsylvania (see 
Section 5). 
4.1.2 Full dynamic problem 
Given that the optimization problem faced in each period and state variables are 
specified above, now we explain how state variables evolve over time. Given the 
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choices made in each period, the budget constraint (Equation 14) determines the next 
period’s wealth. Each member’s health (ℎ𝑚𝑚,ℎ𝑝𝑝) evolves following a first-order Markov 
process, where there are five states: 𝐺𝐺, 𝐵𝐵, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, and Death (𝐴𝐴) as the absorbing 
state. The health transition matrix is a function of age, gender, marital status (single 
versus coupled), and permanent income (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) of households. Retirement income 
({𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚,𝑌𝑌𝑝𝑝} = 𝐘𝐘) does not change over time except when a member is widowed and starts 
receiving a survivor benefit: This member is reassigned the larger value in the couple’s 
income vector.19 Lastly, the family situation (𝐹𝐹) changes when one is widowed. Not only 
does that household becomes single, but also for households with a child outside the 
10-mile radius, we allow for a 50% chance that a child moves within the 10-mile radius. 
We made this modeling choice to be consistent with the observations from the HRS 
data. 
The full maximization problem can be stated with the following Bellman equation: 
 
𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡,𝑊𝑊,𝐡𝐡, 𝛏𝛏,𝐹𝐹,𝐘𝐘;𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) = max
𝐜𝐜,𝐪𝐪,𝐤𝐤
{𝑈𝑈(𝐜𝐜,𝐪𝐪,𝐤𝐤;𝐡𝐡, 𝛏𝛏,𝐹𝐹) +
𝛽𝛽𝐄𝐄�𝜂𝜂(𝑡𝑡,𝐡𝐡,𝐹𝐹;𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡 + 1,𝑊𝑊′,𝐡𝐡′, 𝛏𝛏′,𝐹𝐹′,𝐘𝐘′;𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) + �1 − 𝜂𝜂(𝑡𝑡,𝐡𝐡,𝐹𝐹;𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)�𝑏𝑏(𝑊𝑊′)�},
        (18)  
subject to the budget constraint (Equation 14), the transfer rules (Equations 15 to 17), 
the stochastic transitions of health and associated transitions of retirement income and 
family status explained above. 𝛽𝛽 is a time discount factor, 𝜂𝜂 is the probability of survival, 
and 𝑏𝑏 is the bequest utility function. 
                                               
19 This is based on the following observations. For Social Security, though many factors 
including the age of the widowed spouse and when the deceased started collecting her/his 
benefits affect the exact rule applied, one common situation is that the widowed spouse may 
choose her/his own benefit or 100% of the deceased spouse’s benefits. For defined-benefit 
pensions, Johnson, Uccello, and Goldwyn (2003) report that the vast majority (72%) of men, 
who are more likely to have higher retirement income, choose joint-and-survivor pensions, 
while a small fraction (31%) of women do so. 
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This optimization problem’s solution gives rise to the individual demands for 
nursing home beds that depends on 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 and 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 for out-of-pocket patients and 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 for 
Medicaid patients. 
4.2 Nursing homes 
There are 𝐽𝐽 nursing homes in a single nursing home market. Preference shocks 
(𝜉𝜉𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘) in the household’s problem allow us to handle the local competition among the 
nursing homes in a tractable way. 
Nursing home 𝑗𝑗 takes as given prices and care intensity of the market’s other 




 𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗(𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ,𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗)𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 + 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗(𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗)𝑀𝑀− 𝑐𝑐(𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 ,𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗) − 𝜒𝜒,




where 𝜒𝜒 is the per-period fixed cost of operation and 𝑀𝑀 is the Medicaid reimbursement 
rate. 𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗(. ) and 𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗(. ) are residual demands for nursing home 𝑗𝑗 from private payers and 
Medicaid enrollees, respectively. 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 is the total number of patients. Note that the 
demand from Medicaid enrollees depends only on the care intensity of the nursing 
home, while that from private patients depends on both price and intensity. The variable 
cost function 𝑐𝑐 is an increasing function of the number of patients and the care intensity. 
The first order conditions are similar to the ones derived in Section 3: 




𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗: �𝑀𝑀 − 𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗 ,𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗)�
𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗









Given the exogenous policy parameters, including the Medicaid reimbursement 
rate (𝑀𝑀) and eligibility rules, the nursing home market’s equilibrium is composed of the 
following objects:20 The value function (𝑉𝑉); the policy function for consumption, 
{𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔}𝑔𝑔=𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝; the policy functions for type and intensity of care, {𝑘𝑘𝑔𝑔, 𝑞𝑞𝑔𝑔𝑘𝑘}𝑔𝑔=𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝; the prices and 
intensity set by nursing homes, {𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ,𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗}𝑗𝑗=1
𝐽𝐽 ; the nursing home demand, {𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗 ,𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗}𝑗𝑗=1
𝐽𝐽 ; and 
the joint distribution of households over individual states that satisfy the following 
conditions. 
1. Given the price and care intensity set by nursing homes and the Medicaid 
rules, the value and policy functions of the households solve the 
maximization problem (Equation 18. 
2. Given the household demand, Medicaid reimbursement policy, and prices 
and intensity set by its competitors, the price and intensity set by each 
nursing home maximize its profit (Equation 19). 
3. The nursing home market clears. 
4. The joint distribution of households is consistent with their decision rules. 
4.4 Computation 
Given the prices and care intensity set by the nursing homes ({𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ,𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗}𝑗𝑗=1
𝐽𝐽 ), the 
households’ optimization problems can be solved by backward induction. We solve the 
static maximization problem of the households whose age is the largest value allowed 
                                               
20 We omit the state variables and age subscript for brevity. 
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(𝑇𝑇), then use the value function at age 𝑇𝑇 as the continuation value for the maximization 
problem at 𝑇𝑇 − 1, and so forth. 
In our model, nursing homes face the same cost structure and preference shocks 
drawn from identical distributions. This ensures symmetric demand across nursing 
homes. Therefore, we can focus on a symmetric equilibrium where all the nursing 
homes choose the same price and intensity. To check that a certain price and intensity 
combination (𝑃𝑃∗,𝑄𝑄∗) represent equilibrium values, we numerically evaluate the 
derivative terms in the first order conditions of the nursing homes (Equations 21 and 22) 
by re-solving the household’s problem assuming that one nursing home slightly deviates 
from (𝑃𝑃∗,𝑄𝑄∗), and then examine whether (𝑃𝑃∗,𝑄𝑄∗) satisfy the first order conditions. 
5. Calibration 
We calibrate the parameters with standard values used in the literature or with 
data for direct estimation before solving the model. We calibrate the other parameters 
such that the model’s key moments match the empirical counterparts. Table 3 lists the 
parameters in the model and the calibrated values. In the rest of this subsection, we 
explain the calibration in more detail. 
5.1 Preferences 





We set 𝛾𝛾1 = 3, which is a standard value in the literature. 
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Table 3: List of the parameters calibrated 
Parameter Value Description Source/Target 
A. Taken from the literature    
𝛾𝛾1 3 Risk aversion over noncare consumption Standard value 
𝛽𝛽 0.97 Time discount factor Standard value 
𝑟𝑟 0.03 Real interest rate  
𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏, 𝜅𝜅𝑏𝑏 1, -$8K Bequest utility function parameters Ameriks et al. (forthcoming) 
𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂  $20K Consumption value of OOP stay at a NH Hackmann (2019) 
𝜌𝜌 w/o family $35 HCBC per hour cost w/o family support Mommaerts (2016) 
𝛹𝛹 $20K Fixed cost of using HCBC Achou (2016) 
  w/o family support  
𝑀𝑀 $76.5K Medicaid reimbursement rate for NHs Hackmann (2019) 
𝛥𝛥𝑊𝑊 $10K Consumption under welfare Supplemental Security Insurance 
𝜒𝜒 $1.3M NH fixed cost of operation Hackmann (2019) 
B. Estimated from the data    
𝛱𝛱𝐻𝐻 See Appendix A Health transition matrices HRS data 
𝐽𝐽 11 Number of nursing homes PA Department of Health data 
𝑌𝑌,𝑊𝑊,𝑊𝑊‾  $25K, $60K, $120K Medicaid eligibility parameters PA Medicaid rules 
Note: Dollar values are in 2017 dollars. Flow variables are reported in terms of per-year values. 
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Table 3: List of the parameters calibrated (continued) 
Parameter Value Description Source/Target 
C. Calibrated in the model   
𝛾𝛾2 1.2 Risk aversion over care consumption Mean/median ratio in 𝑞𝑞 under ADLH 
𝜃𝜃ℎ,𝜅𝜅ℎ 0.0009, 300 for ℎ = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 Care utility function parameters Mean and 25-pctl of 𝑞𝑞 
 0.00021, 50 for ℎ = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿   
𝜎𝜎𝜉𝜉 0.1 S.d. of preference shocks Share of care type choice 
   explained by observables 
𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 $10.1K Consumption value of Share of NH among Medicaid patients 
  Medicaid stay at a NH  
𝜌𝜌 w/ family $17.5 HCBC per hour cost w/ family resources Difference in the HCBC share 
   between w/ and w/o family 
𝑐𝑐 0.177 Level of NH cost function Profit after the fixed cost 
𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽 1.277, 0.665 Returns to scale in NH cost function Satisfying (21) and (22) 
   at 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = $85𝐾𝐾 and 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 = 2,000 
Note: Dollar values are in 2017 dollars. Flow variables are reported in terms of per-year values. 
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For care consumption, we use a CRRA utility function with a subsistence level of 







The subsistence level of care consumption governs the left tail of the distribution of care 
hours used (𝑞𝑞). We set it to be 300 hours per year for ℎ = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 and 50 hours per year 
for ℎ = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 to match the 25th percentiles of the distribution of 𝑞𝑞 from the model to their 
empirical counterparts, conditional on ℎ. Note that with the utility multiplier, 𝜃𝜃ℎ, in the 
overall flow utility function (Equation 13), our utility function essentially has the same 
functional form as in Ameriks et al. (forthcoming). The utility multiplier affects the overall 
level of care consumption. We set it to match the average care hours used, conditional 
on being ADLL and ADLH, separately. We allow preferences over care and noncare 
consumption to differ in the risk aversion. In fact, to reproduce the data’s long right tail 
of care hours, the model requires that the marginal utility of care consumption 
diminishes more slowly than that of the noncare consumption utility function, achieved 
with 𝛾𝛾2 < 𝛾𝛾1. More specifically, we target the mean/median ratio of care hours under 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, and set 𝛾𝛾2 = 1.2. When in need of long-term care, preference shocks (𝜉𝜉𝑘𝑘) affect 
the choice of care. The larger the variance of preference shocks, the more choice is 
driven by factors not explicitly modeled, so the care choice becomes more random. The 
standard deviation of 𝜉𝜉𝑘𝑘 targets the share of care-type choices explained by the 
observables (see Section 5.6). 
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We set the risk-free interest rate (𝑟𝑟) to be 3% per year and the time discount 
factor (𝛽𝛽) such that 𝛽𝛽 = 1
1+𝑝𝑝
. Following Ameriks et al. (forthcoming), we use the following 




,                    (25) 
where 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 determines the overall strength of the bequest motive while 𝜅𝜅𝑏𝑏 < 0 makes the 
bequest a luxury good compared to noncare consumption. Based on the estimates from 
Ameriks et al. (forthcoming), we set 𝜃𝜃𝑏𝑏 = 1 and 𝜅𝜅𝑏𝑏 = −$8𝐾𝐾. 
5.2 Initial joint distribution and health transitions 
The model starts from age 70 and individuals can live to age 110 (𝑇𝑇 = 110). To 
obtain the initial joint distribution of the state variables at the youngest age (70), we use 
the cross-section of the following households from a single wave (HRS 2014): (i) single 
households between ages 68 and 72; (ii) coupled households with an average age 
between 68 and 72 and where the spouses’ age difference is less than 10 years. There 
are 1,247 such households. 
Starting from this initial joint distribution, we generate a representative population 
of Americans older than 70 from the model by simulating their health transitions using 
the transition matrices estimated from the HRS data.21 Note that we do not allow for 
population aging as we focus on the stationary distribution in a nursing home market. 
                                               
21 To reduce the sampling error in the simulation, we create 100 clones of each household from 
the initial joint distribution. We apply the sampling weights from the HRS in all the analyses in 
this paper. The sampling weights are rescaled to make the total elderly population in the 
model the same as that in an average nursing home market (24,000) according to the 
Pennsylvania Department Health data and the census. 
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The transition matrices over the five health states (𝐺𝐺,𝐵𝐵,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, and death 
as the absorbing state) are functions of each member’s age and gender, whether single 
or coupled, as well as the household’s permanent income, (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃), as in Jones et al. 
(2018). We measure the permanent income as the sum of Social Security and defined-
benefit pension incomes because that can be considered as a proxy for households’ 
lifetime earnings. See Appendix A for more details on the transition matrix estimation. 
5.3 Long-term care costs 
A nursing home stay’s out-of-pocket cost and care intensity is determined in the 
equilibrium, as an outcome of local competition among nursing homes. As explained 
below, we calibrate the parameters in the nursing home cost function such that the 
equilibrium price (𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗) and the intensity (𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗) — which are common across nursing homes 
in the symmetric equilibrium — are $85,000 per year and 2,000 hours per year, 
respectively. These are based on the Nursing Home Reports data for the former and the 
standard value used in the literature for the latter (e.g., Mommaerts 2016). Regarding 
the consumption value of an out-of-pocket nursing home stay (𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 ), Hackmann (2019) 
reports that the nonhealth-related resident cost for a nursing home is about one-third of 
the health-related cost. Based on this, we assume that 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 = $20,000, approximately a 
quarter of the out-of-pocket expense. We calibrate 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 to be $10,100, about half of 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 , 
to match the share of Medicaid patients that enter a nursing home, which is an 
increasing function of this parameter. 
The HCBC expenses are composed of two parts for those without family support: 
The per-unit price (𝜌𝜌𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹, where 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹 stands for no family support) and the fixed cost of 
using HCBC (𝛹𝛹). We calibrate 𝜌𝜌𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹 to be $35 per hour, based on the formal, heavy-care 
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cost used in Mommaerts (2016). 𝛹𝛹 captures the fact that to receive care at home while 
not having any family to rely on, the patient also has to purchase services to replace 
basic home production. Achou (2016) reports that the average home production among 
older couples is between 1,000 to 1,500 hours per year. We calibrate 𝛹𝛹 to be $20,000 
per year based on this information. We assume that individuals with family support do 
not face a fixed cost of using HCBC. In addition, we allow the HCBC unit cost to be 
lower for those with family to reflect the care providers’ lower opportunity costs 
(foregone wages and/or leisure).22 We calibrate 𝜌𝜌𝐹𝐹 to be half of 𝜌𝜌𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹, to match the 
difference in the share of HCBC between those who do and do not have family support. 
Note that, for private patients whose demand for care is close to 2,000 hours per 
year and without family support, entering a nursing home is a more cost-effective option 
than using HCBC. Given that a nursing home stay comes with $20,000 of consumption 
value, the effective cost of 2,000 hours of care is $65,000. For HCBC, individuals 
without family support need to spend $70,000 to receive 2,000 hours of care ($35 ×
2000), so even without taking into account the fixed cost of using HCBC (𝛹𝛹), HCBC is a 
more expensive option. This reflects the increasing returns to scale over the care 
intensity feasible under the institutional setup (see below). Of course, for those whose 
demand for care is not close to 2,000 hours per year, or for those with family support, 
HCBC will be a more economical option. 
                                               
22 If the informal care is provided by an already retired, healthy spouse, the opportunity cost is 
composed only of foregone leisure. Even for the other cases, the effect of informal caregiving 
on labor supply is significant only for highly-intensive caregiving (Butrica and Karamcheva 
2014). 
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5.4 Medicaid rules and SSI transfer 
There are variations across states in how much income and wealth households 
with a Medicaid patient and a healthy spouse can keep. We calibrate the parameters in 
this rule based on Pennsylvania.23 The minimum amount of income to be kept (Y) is set 
to be $25,000, which is the average between the minimum ($20,000) and the maximum 
($30,000) values of the Minimum Monthly Maintenance Needs Allowance set by the 
federal government. The threshold up to which households can keep the full value of its 
wealth (W) is set to be $60,000, based on the fact that the spouse in the community can 
keep the house and the median value of home equity among couples and under 
Medicaid in the HRS is $60,000. The maximum amount of wealth those households can 
keep, in addition to the home equity (𝑊𝑊‾ ), is $120,000 in Pennsylvania. 
The Medicaid reimbursement rate (𝑀𝑀), the amount that Medicaid pays to nursing 
homes per Medicaid patient, is set to be $76,500 based on Hackmann (2019). This is 
10% lower than the out-of-pocket price. 
We also model a transfer program that allows for the noncare consumption floor 
(𝛥𝛥𝑊𝑊) for the households with insufficient resources. We set 𝛥𝛥𝑊𝑊 to be $10,000 per year 
based on the Supplemental Security Income. 
5.5 Nursing home costs 
Nursing homes incur a fixed cost of operation (𝜒𝜒), set to be $1.3 million per year 
based on Hackmann (2019). The variable cost function is governed by three 
parameters: 𝑐𝑐 sets the overall level of the cost, and 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 determine the returns to 
scale over the number of patients and the care intensity, respectively. We set 𝑐𝑐 such 
                                               
23 https://www.medicaidplanningassistance.org/medicaid-eligibility-pennsylvania 
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that, at the equilibrium price (𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 =$85K) and intensity (𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 = 2,000 hours) in the baseline, 
each nursing home has the level of profit that is positive net of the fixed cost of 
operation (𝜒𝜒) but not too large. At such a level of profit, the current number of nursing 
homes (𝐽𝐽 = 11) can be supported as an equilibrium. Setting 𝑐𝑐 = 0.177 generates such a 
level of profit (see Section 5.6 for more details). 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 are calibrated such that the 
FOCs (Equations 21 and 22) from the nursing home’s maximization problem are 
satisfied at the equilibrium price and baseline intensity. The calibrated cost function 
suggests that the nursing homes have decreasing returns to scale over the number of 
patients (𝛼𝛼 = 1.277 > 1) and increasing returns to scale over intensity (𝛽𝛽 = 0.665 < 1). 
The former reflects the capacity constraint on the number of beds, and keeps the size of 
nursing homes consistent with that observed in the data — on average about 140 
patients per nursing home. The latter may reflect that additional measures they take to 
increase the intensity of care (e.g., hiring skilled nursing staff and specialists, 
purchasing better medical equipment) can be efficiently shared by patients in the 
institutional set up where all patients use the same type of care. This is not possible, for 
example, for home care. 
5.6 Model fit 
In this subsection, we show that our quantitative model matches the targeted 
moments well, on the intensive margin (the number of care hours used) as well as the 
extensive margin (the care type used). We also test the model performance on some 
nontargeted moments. 
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Table 4 presents the targeted moments.24 Empirical and model-generated 
moments line up very closely. Panel A shows that the model does a good job in 
matching the intensive margin of the distribution conditional on health status, in terms of 
the average (the target for 𝜃𝜃ℎ), the 25th percentiles (the target for 𝜅𝜅ℎ), and the mean-to-
median ratio (the target for 𝛾𝛾2). On the extensive margin, conditional on being 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, 
those who have family support — i.e., those with either a healthy spouse or a child 
within 10 miles — are 24 percentage points more likely to use HCBC. This is generated 
from the model by having the effective HCBC cost to be much lower for those with 
family support (𝜌𝜌𝐹𝐹) than for those without family support (𝜌𝜌𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹). For those on Medicaid, 
entering a nursing home and using HCBC are equally likely, which is generated by 
having the consumption value of being in a nursing home as a Medicaid patient (𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀) to 
be about the same as the consumption floor guaranteed for a Medicaid patient using 
HCBC (𝛥𝛥𝑊𝑊).25 
  
                                               
24 Note that the median of care hours under ADLL as well as the overall levels of the HCBC 
share are not targeted. 
25 Recall that we assume a Medicaid nursing home stay and using HCBC as a Medicaid patient 
are equal in terms of the care intensity, i.e., 𝑞𝑞 = 2,000. 
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Table 4: Model fit for the targeted moments 
A. Care hours distribution   
Health status 25p 50p 75p Mean N 
Data      
   ADLH 1,188 2,000 3,720 2,574 1,723 
   ADLL 288 744 2,000 1,355 1,205 
Model      
   ADLH 1,238 2,000 2,000 2,493  
   ADLL 248 840 2,000 1,320  
B. Share of HCBC (under ADLH)   
Conditions    Share of HCBC (%) N 
Data      
   Have family resources    73 1,408 
   Do not have family resources    49 315 
   On Medicaid    49 486 
Model      
   Have family resources    75  
   Do not have family resources    51  
   On Medicaid    47  
Note: Tabulation uses the sample in their 80s. For the care hour distribution, a nursing home 
stay is coded as 2,000 hours per year. 
Our quantitative model’s main focus is to reproduce the LTC demand patterns 
across health, family status, and financial resources. The targeted moments mostly 
span the first two dimensions. In Figure 5, we examine the model’s ability to reproduce 
patterns of LTC use across wealth and income quartiles, which were not targeted in the 
calibration. The empirical moments in Figure 5 (Panels a and c), which is a reproduction 
of Panel A of Table 2, show that the share of HCBC has an inverted U-shape over 
financial resources, in particular over wealth. At first, it increases with financial 
resources and then decreases. Exactly the same patterns are generated from the model 
(Panels b and d), though these are not targeted. The sizes of the slopes are also similar 
between the data and the model. The only dimension with a gap is over income 
quartiles for those with family: The empirical moments are mostly flat while the model 
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moments increase with income. So overall, our model is successful in accounting for 
how health, family, and financial resources affect the key long-term care choices. 
Figure 5: Share of HCBC (%): Conditional on family and financial resources 
 
            (a) By wealth quartiles, data                    (b) By wealth quartiles, model 
 
           (c) By income quartiles, data                       (d) By income quartiles, model 
Note: Figure uses the sample in their 80s and under ADLH. 
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To see what forces in the model generate the observed moments, Figure 5 
shows how the likelihood of choosing each care option varies as a function of family 
support and financial resources for an 80-year-old single male under 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻. The 
patterns are essentially the same as what the stylized model (Section 3) predicts, 
except that the quantitative model now also allows for roles of unobserved factors in the 
form of preference shocks (hence, the choices are not deterministic). To see the impact 
of income, we compare the figures in the left with a very high income level ($1 million 
per year) and those on the right with a very low income level ($10,000 per year). For 
those with a high income level, Medicaid is never a relevant option. When they have 
almost no wealth other than income, they would prefer using HCBC over entering a 
nursing home, as their desired intensity of care is below 2,000 hours per year. As the 
wealth level goes up, the optimal care intensity approaches 2,000 hours per year, which 
means that entering a nursing home becomes more attractive. Indeed, for those who do 
not have family support (the top-left figure), entering a nursing home becomes more 
likely to be chosen for wealth levels between $12,000 and $250,000 (log of wealth 
between 2.5 and 5.5). For those with families (the bottom-left figure), HCBC stays as a 
dominant option at any wealth level. For those with a low income level, if they haven’t 
accumulated enough wealth, they will be a Medicaid patient. For them, entering a 
nursing home and using HCBC is almost equally likely. As we increase the wealth level, 
we see that at some point, using HCBC out of pocket becomes a dominant option. They 
have too many financial resources to be a Medicaid patient, but too little to enter a 
nursing home out of pocket. The wealth level where the out-of-pocket HCBC becomes a 
dominant option is lower for those with family resources (the bottom-right figure) than for 
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those without family resources (the top-right figure). Again, entering a nursing home 
becomes more attractive as the wealth level further increases, resulting in the inverted 
U-shape of the HCBC share over financial resources. 
Figure 6: Likelihood of choosing care options (ADLH, 80 years old)
 
Note: The unit of the horizontal axis is log of wealth, where wealth is measured 
in multiples of $1,000. For example, log wealth of 4 corresponds to the wealth 
level exp(4) × $1,000 = $55,000. 
At the equilibrium price (𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 =$85,000) and intensity (𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 = 2,000), each nursing 
home has about 140 patients, where three-quarters of those are Medicaid patients. The 
revenue for each nursing home is about $10.7 million, while the variable cost is $7.5 
million, making the annual profit before the fixed cost to be around $3.2 million. This is 
larger than the fixed operational cost ($1.3 million), but arguably not large enough to 
make profitable a new nursing home’s entry into the market if we also take into account 
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entry costs not modeled. Hence, the calibrated number of nursing homes (𝐽𝐽 = 11) is 
supported as an equilibrium in the market. 
6. Policy experiments 
In this section, we use our quantitative model to investigate the effects of LTSS 
policy experiments on households, nursing homes, and Medicaid expenditures. We first 
examine two policy experiments that target the market’s supply-side and then study two 
policy experiments that target the market’s demand-side. For each policy considered, 
we examine how equilibrium price and nursing home care intensity, as well as demand 
for it, change compared to the baseline model. We also show changes in the consumer 
surplus and its distribution over heterogeneous households, producer surplus, and 
Medicaid expenditures to examine the efficiency, as well as the distributional impacts, of 
the considered policy.26 For all the experiments, we highlight the importance of fully 
capturing the feedback between the changed household demand and nursing homes’ 
pricing and intensity decisions in correctly assessing the policy outcomes. 
6.1 Supply-side targeted policy experiments 
In this section we examine two public policies targeting the supply side of the 
nursing home market: (i) an increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate for nursing 
                                               
26 The consumer surplus is calculated as one-time wealth transfers that need to be made to the 
youngest households (age 70) in the baseline model to give them the same utility as with the 
policy experiment. The policies will affect the welfare and behavior of even those households 
that do not currently need LTC as forward-looking households take into account the changes 
in LTC options and better or worse insurance provided by Medicaid under the considered 
policy. Also, we do not model how additional funds needed to implement the policies are 
financed. Therefore, we do not take into account the distortionary effects of taxes used to 
finance the policy change. 
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homes, and (ii) a nursing home entry subsidized by the government. There is a large 
literature assessing the effects of Medicaid reimbursement rates on nursing home care 
intensity. While theory predicts positive effects (Gertler 1989, and Nyman 1985), non-
structural estimation produced various results (see Grabowski 2001 for a review). More 
recently, Hackmann (2019) used a structural approach to estimate effects of Medicaid 
reimbursement policy, as well as subsidized entry of a nursing home. Our quantitative 
analysis complements the work of Hackmann (2019) in that we incorporate a micro-
founded demand side into our analysis. 
6.1.1 More generous Medicaid reimbursement 
The Medicaid reimbursement rate is based on the average variable costs faced 
by nursing homes in a given market. In the baseline model, based on the observations 
from Pennsylvania, it is set 10% below the out-of-pocket price. We now examine the 
effects of increasing the Medicaid reimbursement rate by 10% ($7,650). The results of 
the experiment are reported in the second and third columns of Tables 5, (Columns 2 
and 3), Table 6, and Table 7 (Columns 1 and 2). 
As discussed in Section 3.2, higher return on Medicaid beds induces nursing 
homes to increase care intensity in order to attract more Medicaid residents but the 
effect on price and number of private beds is theoretically ambiguous. Table 5 reports 
that intensity increases by 68 hours per year (3.2%), attracting about four additional 
Medicaid residents per nursing home. Higher care intensity and additional Medicaid 
residents increase the marginal bed cost by $1,900 per year (2.8%). Nursing homes 
pass this entirely to the private residents, increasing the price by the same amount 
(2.2%). As a result, each nursing home loses 0.6 of the private bed, with a null change 
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for private revenue due to the higher price. As each nursing home collects $1.13 million 
(13.9%) more in Medicaid reimbursements, the profits increase by $760,000 or 37.4%. 
The increase in the care intensity we find is consistent with the estimates in 
Grabowski (2001) and Hackmann (2019). However, Hackmann (2019) finds a larger, 
8.7% increase in intensity measured in care hours and the opposite effect on the out-of-
pocket price, which declines by 4.5%. Hackmann (2019)’s assumption of constant 
return to scale in the size of nursing home (𝛼𝛼 = 1) removes one of the key channels 
through which the equilibrium price goes up — the increased marginal cost due to a 
larger number of patients. On the other hand, Hackmann (2019) models nonprofit 
nursing homes which place a nonmonetary value on the number of residents they 
admit, while our quantitative analysis abstracts from the differences in objective 
functions among nursing homes for tractability. 
Table 5: Supply-side targeted policy experiments — effects on a nursing home 
 Baseline Increased Medicaid 
reimbursement rate 
Subsidized 
entry of a NH   
  𝜟𝜟 𝜟𝜟% 𝜟𝜟 𝜟𝜟% 
NH care intensity (𝑸𝑸𝒋𝒋, hours per 
year) 
2,000 +64 +3.2 −155 −7.3 
NH price (𝑷𝑷𝒋𝒋, $K) 85.0 +1.9 +2.2 −4.1 −10.7 
Marginal cost ($K) 69.2 +1.9 +2.8 −6.3 −8.2 
Private residents 31.2 −0.6 −1.9 +4.3 +13.8 
Medicaid residents 106.2 +3.8 +3.6 −19.5 −18.4 
NH private revenue ($M) 2.65 +0.01 +0.0 +0.05 +1.9 
NH Medicaid revenue ($M) 8.13 +1.13 +13.9 −0.50 −18.4 
NH profits ($M) 2.03 +0.76 +37.4 −0.08 −3.9 




Given the small changes in price and intensity of nursing home care, the overall 
impact on the demand side is limited, but the policy has important distributional effects. 
Table 6 reports the consequences of higher price and intensity of nursing home care on 
the household LTC choice and care hours used. For the households at the bottom two 
wealth quartiles, the share of Medicaid residents increases. This reflects the reduced 
share of Medicaid HCBC patients for the bottom wealth quartile and the reduced share 
of private HCBC patients for the second wealth quartile. For the households in the third 
wealth quartile, the higher NH price induces some to switch to the private HCBC option. 
In terms of the average hours used, the policy reduces inequality by increasing usage 
for the bottom half of the wealth distribution while having a null effect on the other half. 
Given the limited impact on the demand side, the increase in the Medicaid 
expenditure ($10.9 million) is mostly absorbed as additional producer surplus ($8.4 
million), though the latter is slightly smaller due to the increased cost (Table 7, Panel 
A).27 The consumer surplus on average increases, but quantitatively it is very small 
($400,000). Panel B of Table 7 reveals why the increase in consumer surplus is limited. 
Those who are more likely to be a Medicaid patient at some point — bottom three 
wealth quartiles — benefit from the higher nursing home care intensity, while those who 
are more likely to pay for nursing home out of pocket — the top wealth quartile — lose 
due to the higher price. 
                                               
27 In calculating the total Medicaid expenditure, we take the sum of Medicaid reimbursements to 
all 11 nursing homes and its expenditure on Medicaid HCBC patients, and then subtract the 
amount of financial resources Medicaid patients forfeit. There is no direct evidence on how 
much Medicaid pays for HCBC patients on average, so we assume it to be the same as the 
Medicaid reimbursement rate for nursing homes in the baseline model ($76.5K) for those 
without family support and a half that rate for those with family support. 
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Table 6: Increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate — effects  
on household care choices 
 Care type choice (%) Mean intensity 
 HCBC Nursing home (hours per year) 
 Private Medicaid Private Medicaid All Private 
HCBC 
Age: 70-79 62.2 12.9 4.5 20.4 1,889 1,795 
 (−0.2) (−0.4) (0.0) (+0.6) (+16) (−1) 
Age: 80-89 61.2 13.2 5.1 20.4 1,962 1,910 
 (−0.2) (−0.5) (−0.2) (+0.7) (+16) (−2) 
Age: 90-99 65.8 10.7 6.3 17.2 1,670 1,476 
 (0.0) (−0.4) (−0.2) (+0.6) (+12) (−5) 
With family 65.9 12.5 2.8 18.9 1,925 1,865 
 (−0.3) (−0.3) (0.0) (+0.7) (+15) (0) 
Without 
family 
53.1 11.8 13.9 21.3 1,559 1,126 
 (+0.4) (−0.6) (−0.4) (+0.6) (+14) (−10) 
Wealth: Q1 33.6 23.9 0.0 42.6 1,447 269 
 (0.0) (−1.2) (0.0) (+1.2) (+28) (−1) 
Wealth: Q2 65.0 15.4 0.5 19.1 1,123 633 
 (−0.7) (−0.1) (−0.1) (+0.9) (+20) (−2) 
Wealth: Q3 87.1 1.5 9.2 2.1 1,309 1,198 
 (+0.5) (−0.1) (−0.6) (0.0) (+3) (−1) 
Wealth: Q4 82.5 0.0 17.5 0.0 4,288 4,758 
 (−0.1) (0.0) (+0.1) (0.0) (−3) (−15) 
Note: This table includes all the individuals whose health is either ADLL or ADLH. The 
numbers in parentheses show the differences compared to the baseline. 
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Table 7: Supply-side targeted policy experiment — welfare evaluations 
A. Aggregates Increased Medicaid Subsidized 
 reimbursement rate entry of a NH 
 𝜟𝜟level ($M) 𝜟𝜟% 𝜟𝜟level ($M) 𝜟𝜟% 
Consumer surplus* +0.4 NA +7.2 NA 
Producer surplus +8.4 +37.4 +1.1 +4.9 
Medicaid expenditures +10.9 +11.1 -9.8** -9.1 
B. Distribution     
Consumer surplus* 𝜟𝜟level 𝜟𝜟level 
by wealth groups (per household, $) (per household, $) 
    Wealth: Q1 +52 +221 
    Wealth: Q2 +364 -144 
    Wealth: Q3 +313 +2,602 
    Wealth: Q4 -32 +12,002 
Note: The table presents the changes compared to the values in the baseline model. 
* The consumer surplus is calculated as one-time wealth transfers needed to be made to 
the youngest households (age 70) in the baseline model to give them the same utility as 
with the policy experiment. The number in Panel A is the summation across households 
while those in Panel B is the average within each wealth group. 
** The change in the Medicaid expenditure in the subsidized NH entry experiment does 
not include the subsidy paid to a NH to reduce the entry cost. 
Some households’ welfare losses due to an increase in the equilibrium price can 
be captured only in a model that explicitly considers the interaction between the supply 
and demand sides in the nursing home market. If we only focused on the direct effect — 
the increase in the care intensity — then the expected increase in the consumer surplus 
would have been larger, potentially leading to a conclusion that the increase in the 
Medicaid reimbursement rate is a cost-effective policy. Our quantitative model, which 
also captures the incentive of nursing homes to increase the price facing larger 
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demand, in contrast, shows that the increase in the Medicaid expenditures is larger than 
the sum of the increases in the consumer and producer surpluses.28 
6.1.2 Incentivized entry of a nursing home 
In the baseline model equilibrium, there are 11 nursing homes, and each nursing 
home has an annual profit of $2M after accounting for the annual fixed operational cost. 
Equilibrium requires that the entry cost is large enough to discourage another nursing 
home’s entry. Limited local competition results in high price of a nursing home bed and 
other distortions due to the market power. If Medicaid or other government programs 
cover the entry cost, however, it is possible to have an entrant that would increase 
market competition. Following Hackmann (2019), we consider the effect of having a 
directed entry of a nursing home.29 
The direct impact of the policy is primarily on the supply side: Nursing homes 
face less demand as the patient pool is shared with the entrant. The direct effect is also 
present on the demand side: A higher number of nursing homes increases the likelihood 
of finding a better match (i.e., they now take the largest draw from 12, instead of 11, 
draws of preference shocks, 𝜉𝜉𝑁𝑁𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗). 
                                               
28 Note that we assume that the policy does not affect the consumption value of a nursing home 
stay for a Medicaid patient (𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀), which is calibrated to be half of the consumption value of a 
nursing home stay for a private patient (𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂 ). If the gap between 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀 and 𝛥𝛥𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂  reflects the public 
care aversion due to the stigma effect and if the policy removes such stigma, the increase in 
the consumer surplus could be larger. If the gap reflects the actual difference in the amenities 
provided to the two types of patients and if the policy removes such a difference by making 
nursing homes provide more amenities to Medicaid residents, then a part of the producer 
surplus in Table 7 would be captured as the consumer surplus. 
29 Unlike Hackmann (2019), who considered a subsidized entry of a public nursing home, we 
consider a private nursing home entry. 
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The nursing homes react to the reduced demand by changing their care intensity 
and prices. The impact of the increased demand on both intensity and price is 
theoretically ambiguous. As shown in Section 3.2, the incentives to change quality and 
price are determined by three channels: the slopes of the Medicaid and private 
demands, the marginal profit on each bed type and the marginal cost of extra intensity. 
On the one hand, sharing the resident pool with more nursing homes means that 





in Equation 22) are smaller, reducing incentives to provide higher quality. On the other 
hand, having fewer residents lowers marginal costs (𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 and 𝐶𝐶𝜕𝜕) which increases 
incentives to provide higher intensity. Similarly, there are counteracting incentives for 
the price changes: The smaller number of out-of-pocket patients (𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗) and the smaller 
marginal bed cost (𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁) reduce the return to a higher price, while the smaller slope of 
demand over price (𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗
) reduces the marginal cost of increasing the out-of-pocket price 
(see Equation 21). Reflecting this theoretical ambiguity, the new entrant’s effect on price 
and intensity of nursing home care in Hackmann (2019) varies across counties 
considered. 
Our quantitative model shows that nursing homes reduce both care intensity and 
price: The last two columns in Table 5 show that intensity goes down by 155 hours per 
year (-7.3%) and price declines by $4,100 (-10.7%). Lower care intensity further 
reduces the Medicaid demand faced by each nursing home, resulting in a big loss of 
Medicaid residents (18.4% or 19.5 beds per nursing home). The number of private 
residents actually increases (13.8% or 4.3 beds per nursing home) due to the lower 
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price. In the end, each incumbent nursing home has, on average, 15 fewer patients (an 
11% loss). Therefore, the subsidized entry of a nursing home makes the incumbents 
smaller, cheaper, and lowers care intensity. The profit reduction is limited (3.9%), as the 
revenue decrease is accompanied by a similar decrease in costs. 
The additional nursing home does not simply absorb residents from other nursing 
homes, but creates reallocation of households across the care types. Moreover, as 
Table 8 shows, the households move in both directions: to and from institutional care. 
Nursing home residents from the wealth distribution’s bottom half free Medicaid nursing 
home beds and become HCBC consumers, with the poorest quartile going to Medicaid 
HCBC and the second quartile to private HCBC. On contrary, LTC recipients who are 
older than 90, have no family, and in the wealth distribution’s top half switch from private 
HCBC to private nursing home. The average hours of LTC decrease mostly due to the 
reduced intensity of the NH care. At the same time, the inequality in care consumption 
increases as the reduction is concentrated in the bottom two wealth quartiles while 
those in the top two wealth quartiles experience almost no change. 
Unsurprisingly, higher competition increases the consumer surplus. The last two 
columns in Table 7, Panel A, show that the additional surplus is large, amounting to 
$7.2 million. The gain is mostly driven by new nursing home residents in the top two 
wealth quartiles, who benefit from both the lower nursing home price and the larger 
selection of nursing homes. The Medicaid nursing home leavers, located in the bottom 
two wealth quartiles, gain virtually nothing, with the loss from the lower NH care 
intensity mitigated by other LTC options as well as the larger selection of nursing 
homes.  
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Table 8: Subsidized entry of a nursing home — effects on household care choices 
 Care type choice (%) Mean intensity 
 HCBC Nursing home (hours per year) 
 Private Medicaid Private Medicaid All Private 
HCBC 
Age: 70-79 62.9 14.2 5.4 17.5 1,826 1,779 
 (+0.5) (+0.9) (+0.9) (−2.3) (−47) (−17) 
Age: 80-89 61.4 14.6 6.6 17.4 1,911 1,915 
 (+0.0) (+0.9) (+1.3) (−2.3) (−35) (+3) 
Age: 90-99 64.6 12.2 8.3 15.0 1,639 1,497 
 (−1.2) (+1.2) (+1.8) (−1.7) (−19) (+16) 
With family 66.9 13.6 3.5 16.0 1,868 1,847 
 (+0.7) (+0.8) (+0.7) (−2.2) (−42) (−18) 
Without 
family 
49.1 14.0 17.9 19.0 1,543 1,185 
 (−3.6) (+1.6) (+3.6) (−1.7) (−2) (+49) 
Wealth: Q1 33.3 28.4 0.0 38.3 1,365 271 
 (−0.3) (+3.3) (0.0) (−3.1) (−54) (+1) 
Wealth: Q2 67.4 15.9 1.3 15.4 1,050 630 
 (+1.7) (+0.4) (+0.7) (−2.8) (−53) (−5) 
Wealth: Q3 84.8 0.8 13.7 0.8 1,296 1,196 
 (−1.8) (−0.8) (+3.9) (−1.3) (−10) (−3) 
Wealth: Q4 81.0 0.0 19.0 0.0 4,297 4,871 
 (−1.6) (0.0) (+1.6) (0.0) (+6) (+98) 
Note: This table includes all the individuals whose health is either ADLL or ADLH. The 
numbers in parentheses show the differences compared to the baseline. 
The producer surplus also increases. While each incumbent loses $80,000, the 
entrant gains a profit of $1.95 million, resulting in an overall increase in producer surplus 
by $1.1 million. The unobserved entry cost makes it difficult to judge this policy’s 
efficiency. If we do not take into account the entry cost, the total Medicaid expenditure 
decreasesby $9.8 million. Most of this cost saving is because Medicaid enrollees 
reallocate from Medicaid nursing home to Medicaid HCBC. This is cheaper for Medicaid 
if recipients have family support, and some of individuals with family leave Medicaid 
altogether to use HCBC out of pocket. Therefore, whether this policy is cost effective or 
not depends on how the entry cost compares to the total gain of $18.1 million. 
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To sum up, stronger competition induced by a nursing home’s subsidized entry 
reduces markups and increases the number of beds provided to out-of-pocket 
residents. At the same time, as nursing homes react to the changed demand by 
reducing the care intensity, the total number of beds used by the Medicaid residents 
decreases even with more nursing homes. The reaction of nursing homes causes 
distributional effects that favor wealthier households.  
6.2 Demand-side targeted policy experiments 
There is a large literature evaluating effects of Medicaid means-tested subsidies 
on households’ savings and welfare (e.g., De Nardi, French, and Jones 2010, Kopecky 
and Koreshkova 2014, De Nardi, French, and Jones 2016, Braun, Kopecky, and 
Koreshkova 2017, and Achou 2020) as well as LTC choice (Grabowski and Gruber 
2007, Mommaerts 2018). 
Following this literature, we study two policies targeting the demand-side of the 
market: (i) an increase in Medicaid generosity by allowing single Medicaid residents to 
keep some wealth, and (ii) giving HCBC subsidies to those who do not have family. 
6.2.1 Increased Medicaid generosity 
In the baseline model, singles who become Medicaid recipients are not allowed 
to keep any significant amount of financial resources or home equity, following the 
current Medicaid eligibility criteria. De Nardi et al. (2011) and Warshawsky and 
Marchand (2017) show that, when it comes to the estate recovery, enforcement of this 
regulation appears to be limited. Based on this observation, Achou (2020) studies how 
strict enforcement of estate recovery affects older households’ welfare. Motivated by 
this literature, we now examine how increasing Medicaid generosity, in the form of 
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allowing single Medicaid recipients to keep wealth up to $20,000,30 affects the nursing 
home market. 
This policy change’s direct impact is on the demand side: It increases the 
number of Medicaid recipients among singles. In particular, many of those who haven’t 
chosen to be on Medicaid but could not afford to enter a nursing home as a private 
resident in the baseline model — hence ended up using limited hours of care under out-
of-pocket HCBC — will now be a Medicaid nursing home resident (see Section 3.1). In 
the absence of nursing homes’ reactions, the number of Medicaid residents at nursing 
homes would increase by 24.3%.31 This results in $300,000 increase in the profit of 
each nursing home, or $3.3 million increase in the total producer surplus. 
Before reporting the nursing homes’ reactions to the policy, it is important to 
weigh the nursing home incentives. As shown in Section 3.2, with almost no direct 
policy effect on the private demand, the price unambiguously increases. The policy 
effect on care intensity is ambiguous. The slope of Medicaid demand with respect to 
intensity (𝜕𝜕𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑗𝑗
), which affects the marginal return to raising intensity, changes through 
two channels: By changing the marginal individuals between the Medicaid nursing home 
and the HCBC option and by expanding the pool of Medicaid residents that nursing 
homes are competing over. The effect of the former channel is theoretically ambiguous 
(see Section 3.1, Proposition 4 (3)), while the effect of the latter channel unambiguously 
                                               
30 $20,000 is slightly less than half of the median home equity that couples on Medicaid keep in 
the HRS data. 
31 Its direct impact on the number of private residents is limited. It goes up by 1.9%. This 
increase comes from the better insurance provided by a more generous Medicaid — hence 
households have an incentive to spend their resources more quickly by entering a nursing 
home out of pocket. 
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increases the slope. At the same time, a larger number of Medicaid patients increases 
the marginal costs (𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 and 𝐶𝐶𝜕𝜕), reducing the incentive to increase the intensity. 
In our quantitative model, nursing home competition over the expanded 
Medicaid-resident pool dominates other channels, so the care intensity increases 
significantly, by 134 hours per year or 6.7% (Table 9). As expected, the price increases 
and by a lot — $11K or 12.9%. The large Medicaid-resident inflow, 36.6 individuals per 
facility or 34.5% (nearly a third larger than the direct impact), outweighs the outflow of 
private residents: 6.9 individuals per facility or 22.1%. As a result, each nursing home 
ends up with nearly 30 more residents and a higher share of Medicaid beds (85% 
versus 77%). Higher number of residents drives the marginal cost up by 10.1%. While 
the markup on a private resident increases, the profit margin on a Medicaid bed shrinks. 
Although the total revenue from Medicaid beds increases by more than a third, nursing 
home profits decline by a small amount ($60,000 or 3%). 
Table 9: Demand-side targeted policy experiment — effects on a nursing home 
 Baseline More generous 
Medicaid 
HCBC 
subsidy   
  𝜟𝜟 𝜟𝜟% 𝜟𝜟 𝜟𝜟% 
NH care intensity (𝑸𝑸𝒋𝒋, hours 
per year) 
2,000 +134 +6.7 −155 −7.7 
NH price (𝑷𝑷𝒋𝒋, $K) 85.0 +10.9 +12.9 −3.9 −4.5 
Marginal cost ($K) 69.2 +7.0 +10.1 −5.9 −8.5 
Private residents 31.2 −6.9 −22.1 −3.0 −9.6 
Medicaid residents 106.2 +36.6 +34.5 −13.6 −12.8 
NH private revenue ($M) 2.65 −0.32 −12.1 −0.36 −13.6 
NH Medicaid revenue ($M) 8.13 +2.79 +34.3 −1.05 −12.9 
NH profits ($M) 2.03 −0.06 −3.0 +0.06 +3.0 




Who fills up the new Medicaid beds? Table 10 shows that the new nursing home 
residents are coming from all but the top wealth quartile with larger numbers of new 
residents at the bottom. Most new residents trade the out-of-pocket HCBC for Medicaid 
nursing home. However, some HCBC recipients in the second wealth quartile become 
Medicaid HCBC recipients. Private residents leaving nursing homes due to its higher 
price belong to all but the bottom wealth quartile. They mostly switch to the out-of-
pocket HCBC, and this pattern is most noticeable at the top wealth quartile where 
Medicaid options are never chosen. The average number of care hours consumed also 
increases significantly, especially for the two bottom wealth quartiles, reducing the 
inequality in care consumption. 
Medicaid expenditure increases by $25.8 million (Table11, Panel A). Medicaid 
not only collects less wealth from each single recipient, but also faces an increase in 
recipiency by single households. This policy results in a small reduction in the producer 
surplus (-$600,000) and a relatively large increase in the consumer surplus (+$13.4 
million). However, the total surplus gain amounts only to a half of the increase in the 
Medicaid expenditure. The gains in the consumer surplus are not equally distributed 
across the households. The households in the second wealth quartile gain the most, as 
these are more likely to enter Medicaid when allowed to keep some of their wealth 
under the new policy. The gain at the top wealth quartile is limited. Though they value 
higher Medicaid insurance for situations with scant financial resources and no family 
support, they are less likely to be in such situations than the other wealth groups and 
are hurt by nursing homes’ higher prices. 
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Table 10: More generous Medicaid — effects on household care choices 
 Care type choice (%) Mean intensity 
 HCBC Nursing home (hours per year) 
 Private Medicaid Private Medicaid All Private 
HCBC 
Age: 70-79 57.6 14.1 3.7 24.7 2,019 1,967 
 (−4.8) (+0.8) (−0.8) (+4.9) (+146) (+171) 
Age: 80-89 54.6 15.1 4.2 26.1 2,109 2,125 
 (−6.8) (+1.4) (−1.1) (+6.4) (+163) (+213) 
Age: 90-99 56.7 13.3 5.0 25.0 1,850 1,664 
 (−9.1) (+2.3) (−1.5) (+8.3) (+192) (+183) 
With family 58.2 14.6 2.1 25.1 2,090 2,092 
 (−8.0) (+1.8) (−0.7) (+6.9) (+180) (+227) 
Without 
family 
49.2 13.1 11.5 26.3 1,674 1,233 
 (−3.5) (+0.7) (−2.8) (+5.6) (+129) (+97) 
Wealth: Q1 22.1 24.9 0.0 53.0 1,677 218 
 (−11.5) (−0.2) (0.0) (+11.6) (+258) (−52) 
Wealth: Q2 54.7 19.4 0.2 25.7 1,307 670 
 (−11.0) (+3.9) (−0.4) (+7.5) (+204) (+35) 
Wealth: Q3 85.5 3.2 7.0 4.4 1,385 1,262 
 (−1.1) (+1.6) (−2.8) (+2.3) (+79) (+63) 
Wealth: Q4 84.9 0.0 15.1 0.0 4,350 4,745 
 (+2.3) (0.0) (−2.3) (0.0) (+59) (−28) 
Note: This table includes all individuals whose health is either ADLL or ADLH. The 
numbers in parentheses show the differences compared to the baseline. 
In short, allowing singles to keep some amount of wealth while being on 
Medicaid increases the Medicaid expenditure more than it increases the consumer 
surplus, while the producer surplus reduces. The policy also creates significant 
distributional effects. Though the policy’s direct impact is on the demand side, the 
nursing homes’ reactions to the changing demand are important in shaping the 
distributional effects. The expanding pool of Medicaid patients would increase the 
nursing homes’ profits in the absence of their reactions. However, competition among 
nursing homes on care intensity results in lower profits. Nursing home response, on the 
other hand, makes the new equilibrium favor poorer individuals as they enjoy more care 
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hours without having to give up all of their financial resources, while the higher price 
disadvantages wealthier households. 
Table 11: Demand-side targeted policy experiment  
outcomes — welfare evaluations 
A. Aggregates Increased Medicaid HCBC 
 generosity subsidy 
 𝜟𝜟level ($M) 𝜟𝜟% 𝜟𝜟level ($M) 𝜟𝜟% 
Consumer surplus* +13.4 NA + 3.6 NA 
Producer surplus -0.6 -3.0 +0.6 +3.0 
Medicaid expenditures +25.8 +26.2 -2.7 -2.7 
B. Distribution     
Consumer surplus* 𝛥𝛥level 𝛥𝛥level 
by wealth groups (per household, $) (per household, $) 
    Wealth: Q1 +4,412 +437 
    Wealth: Q2 +11,368 +1,125 
    Wealth: Q3 +9,986 +3,092 
    Wealth: Q4 +1,624 +2,756 
Note: The table presents the changes compared to the values in the baseline model. 
* The consumer surplus is calculated as one-time wealth transfers needed to be made to 
the youngest households (age 70) in the baseline model to give them the same utility as 
with the policy experiment. The number in Panel A is the summation across households 
while those in Panel B is the average within each wealth group. 
6.2.2 Subsidies for home-and-community-based care 
For individuals without family support, one big obstacle for using HCBC is the 
fixed cost of outsourcing home production as the adverse health condition does not 
allow them to perform basic home production (Achou 2016). In our model, this cost is 
captured by 𝛹𝛹 and is calibrated as $20,000 per year. This cost steers individuals without 
family away from using HCBC as a private patient. As a result, these individuals end up 
being Medicaid recipients and consuming amounts of care largely exceeding the levels 
they would have demanded as a private HCBC patient in the absence of the fixed cost, 
thus increasing Medicaid outlays. In this subsection, we consider a policy where 
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government provides a lump-sum payment to cover half of the HCBC fixed cost 
($10,000) to any non-Medicaid user of HCBC. 
The direct impact of this policy is on the demand side, which reduces demand for 
nursing home care as individuals without family leave the nursing home market for the 
subsidized out-of-pocket HCBC. In the absence of the nursing homes’ reactions, about 
three private residents (10.4%) and 4.3 Medicaid residents (4.4%) would leave each 
nursing home. Lost residents would reduce the profits of each nursing home by 
$160,000. 
How do nursing homes respond to the drop in demand? Theoretically, the effects 
on both price and care intensity are ambiguous. The channels governing nursing home 
incentives in response to the increased competition from HCBC are similar to the case 
of a nursing home’s subsidized entry, discussed in Section 6.1.1. The main difference is 
in the direct effect on the private demand for care. While a nursing home entry makes 
the nursing home option more attractive, the opposite is true for the cheaper HCBC. 
Hence, it is unsurprising that the two experiments’ effects are qualitatively similar up to 
the change in the number of the private nursing home residents and associated 
revenues and profits. 
The last two columns of Table 9 show that the care intensity declines by 155 
hours per year (-7.7%) and price drops by $3,900 (-4.5%). Lower care intensity 
encourages more Medicaid nursing home residents to leave, bringing the total loss to 
13.6 individuals (-12.8%). On the contrary, lower price slightly reduces the loss of the 
private residents to 9.6%. The lower quality and the smaller number of residents reduce 
the marginal cost by $5,900, resulting in a higher profit on each resident. Though 
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revenue from both private and Medicaid residents fall significantly (-13.6% and -12.9%, 
respectively), profits increase slightly (3%). 
Table 12 shows that the new HCBC users come primarily from individuals of all 
ages and all wealth quartiles without family, with most leaving nursing home Medicaid 
beds. While individuals in the bottom quartile switch primarily to Medicaid HCBC, those 
in wealth quartiles two and three switch primarily to private HCBC. The mean hours of 
HCBC do not increase much for the individuals without family support: While those who 
chose this option in the baseline now can afford more hours, those who switch from 
Medicaid options to this option under the subsidy tend to be poorer and so consume 
fewer care hours than the former group. The average intensity of care used declines 
except for the top wealth quartile. This, on one hand, reflects a switch to out-of-pocket 
HCBC, where individuals tend to have lower care intensity than in a nursing home. On 




Table 12: HCBC subsidy — effects on household care choices 
 Care type choice (%) Mean intensity 
 HCBC Nursing home (hours per year) 
 Private Medicaid Private Medicaid All Private 
HCBC 
Age: 70-79 63.7 14.5 4.3 17.6 1,836 1,795 
 (+1.3) (+1.2) (−0.2) (−2.2) (−37) (−1) 
Age: 80-89 63.3 14.6 4.8 17.3 1,906 1,905 
 (+1.9) (+0.9) (−0.5) (−2.4) (−40) (−7) 
Age: 90-99 68.5 11.5 5.8 14.2 1,611 1,478 
 (+2.7) (+0.4) (−0.7) (−4.0) (−47) (−3) 
With family 66.8 14.1 2.7 16.4 1,882 1,867 
 (+0.6) (+1.3) (−0.1) (−1.8) (−28) (+2) 
Without 
family 
59.3 11.8 12.4 16.5 1,459 1,162 
 (+6.4) (−0.6) (−1.9) (−4.2) (−86) (+26) 
Wealth: Q1 34.8 27.7 0.0 37.5 1,346 289 
 (+1.2) (+2.6) (0.0) (−3.9) (−73) (+17) 
Wealth: Q2 68.0 16.2 0.6 15.3 1,044 630 
 (+2.3) (+0.7) (0.0) (−2.9) (−59) (−5) 
Wealth: Q3 90.0 0.8 8.6 0.9 1,267 1,199 
 (+3.4) (−0.8) (−1.2) (−1.2) (−39) (0) 
Wealth: Q4 83.9 0.0 16.2 0.0 4,338 4,818 
 (+1.3) (0.0) (−1.2) (0.0) (+47) (+45) 
Note: This table includes all the individuals whose health is either ADLL or ADLH. The 
numbers in parentheses show the differences compared to the baseline. 
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The last two columns in Table 11, Panel A, indicate that the consumer surplus 
increases by $3.6 million. Similar to the more generous Medicaid experiment, all wealth 
quartiles gain from the subsidy to HCBC (Panel B). However, the welfare gains are 
concentrated in the top half of the wealth distribution, who are more likely to use out-of-
pocket HCBC and nursing home and benefit from their lower costs. 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the increase in the consumer surplus comes 
with no extra expenditures on the government program. In fact, Medicaid outlays,32 net 
of the cost of the new program, decline by $2.7 million. Though the government is now 
subsidizes $10,000 for each household without family that uses HCBC out of pocket, by 
doing so, at the same time, it reduces the number of more costly Medicaid residents. 
The budget savings from the latter ($5.8 million) dominates the additional expenditure 
from the former ($3.1 million). 
This policy experiment suggests that the fixed cost of using HCBC without family 
support is an important barrier. By reducing this barrier, the considered policy both 
reduces the expenditures of the government programs and increases the consumer 
surplus. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we develop a structural model of a nursing home market that 
explicitly captures the households’ LTC choices on the demand side and the nursing 
homes’ choices of intensity and price of care on the supply side. The policy experiments 
                                               
32 We include the expenditure for the HCBC subsidy in the Medicaid expenditure for the ease of 
comparison with other experiments, though the subsidy might be administered through other 
government programs. 
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considered in this paper show that to correctly evaluate policies’ efficiency and 
distributional effects, it is important to take into account the interaction between the 
market’s demand and supply sides. We show that whether the policy targets supply or 
demand side, both households and nursing homes’ decisions are affected. Taking both 
responses into account results in much different equilibrium allocation of care and 
welfare gains or losses relative to the case when one side of the market is fixed. The 
structural model we develop should be useful for evaluating potential outcomes of a 
wide range of LTSS policies, especially those for which empirical evidence of 
effectiveness does not exists. 
Although our framework is a step forward in the analyses of LTSS policies, we 
recognize its limitations and plan to address them in the future. Although our model 
captures rich heterogeneity on the household side — in age, income, wealth, health, 
and family status — for tractability, we abstracted from the heterogeneity on the nursing 
home side. Extending this model to incorporate policy-relevant nursing home 
heterogeneities — e.g., for-profit versus nonprofit (Hackmann 2019), high-end versus 
low-end — will be an important next step. Moreover, for the individuals with family 
nearby, we have taken the availability of family for care duties as given. The response 
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Appendix A: Estimation of the health transition matrices 
We use an approach based on Jones et al. (2018). The transition matrix from the 
current health state (ℎ𝑑𝑑 ∈ {𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝐵𝐵,𝐺𝐺}) to the next period’s health state (ℎ𝑑𝑑+1 ∈
{𝐴𝐴,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝐵𝐵,𝐺𝐺}) is obtained from multinomial logit estimation, which includes a 
constant, current health, gender, age, age squared, whether single or coupled, the 
permanent income of households, as well as interactions of these as the control 
variables. For permanent income, we create quartiles, and we use the dummy variable 
for each quartile. 
To be specific, for each potential transition from 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝐵𝐵,𝐺𝐺} to 𝑗𝑗 ∈
{𝐴𝐴,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝐵𝐵,𝐺𝐺}, the probability of that event is determined as: 
 





𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑡=𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘),  𝑘𝑘 ∈ {𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,𝐵𝐵,𝐺𝐺},
 
(26) 
where {𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘} is the set of coefficient vectors and 𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑡𝑡=𝑖𝑖 is the vector of the control variables 
with ℎ𝑑𝑑 = 𝑖𝑖. We estimate {𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘} by MLE, using all HRS observations from 2004 to 2014. 
We present some examples of the estimated transition matrices in Table A1 (for 
age 70) and Table A2 (for age 90). Rows represent the current state and columns 
represent the next period’s state. At age 70, a “Good" health is a persistent state and 
the more so for a woman and for those with high permanent income. At age 90, needing 
help with ADLs or death two years later becomes much more likely, even conditional on 
being “Good" in the current period. 
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Table A1: Health transition matrix — for age 70, coupled 
  PI 1st quartile PI 4th quartile 
  Death ADLH ADLL Bad Good Death ADLH ADLL Bad Good 
Male ADLH 0.190 0.505 0.186 0.079 0.040 0.229 0.399 0.144 0.100 0.128 
 ADLL 0.161 0.196 0.326 0.186 0.131 0.107 0.096 0.393 0.132 0.273 
 Bad 0.103 0.069 0.107 0.496 0.225 0.096 0.035 0.118 0.433 0.318 
 Good 0.036 0.024 0.057 0.137 0.746 0.018 0.010 0.039 0.066 0.867 
Female ADLH 0.158 0.481 0.217 0.115 0.030 0.158 0.478 0.147 0.115 0.102 
 ADLL 0.100 0.179 0.329 0.265 0.127 0.059 0.117 0.369 0.159 0.297 
 Bad 0.062 0.057 0.146 0.552 0.183 0.054 0.042 0.160 0.435 0.309 
 Good 0.023 0.022 0.057 0.140 0.759 0.009 0.011 0.033 0.051 0.896 
 
 
Table A2: Health transition matrix — for age 90, coupled 
  PI 1st quartile PI 4th quartile 
  Death ADLH ADLL Bad Good Death ADLH ADLL Bad Good 
Male ADLH 0.497 0.417 0.060 0.009 0.017 0.531 0.387 0.048 0.009 0.026 
 ADLL 0.412 0.248 0.187 0.057 0.096 0.326 0.191 0.311 0.045 0.126 
 Bad 0.293 0.168 0.099 0.233 0.207 0.318 0.133 0.147 0.221 0.180 
 Good 0.191 0.133 0.092 0.104 0.480 0.164 0.123 0.126 0.080 0.507 
Female ADLH 0.448 0.434 0.092 0.013 0.013 0.397 0.507 0.064 0.011 0.021 
 ADLL 0.291 0.259 0.260 0.093 0.097 0.189 0.248 0.374 0.057 0.132 
 Bad 0.197 0.156 0.181 0.293 0.172 0.187 0.165 0.249 0.232 0.166 
 Good 0.132 0.132 0.124 0.118 0.494 0.093 0.151 0.146 0.071 0.539 
 
